

JPRS-EER-89-112  
12 OCTOBER 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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JPRS-EER-89-112

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12 OCTOBER 1989

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## HUNGARY

### Reform Economist Profiles MSZMP Factions

25000479 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 2 Sep 89 pp 69-71

[Excerpt of Laszlo Lengyel's book profiling the political parties in Hungary. Lengyel, an economist, is known for his coauthorship of the 1987 PPF-sponsored study "Turnaround and Reform." Expelled from the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] in 1988, he became a founding member of the March Front. First paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction.]

[Text] Laszlo Lengyel, a political scientist, has written a book on the composition, mass support, and electoral prospects of Hungary's political parties. Below we present a sharply abridged version of the section dealing with the MSZMP. (The full text of this study will appear next week in the September issue of the monthly entitled 2000, also published by the HETI VILAGGAZDASAG Corporation.)

As the only party, the MSZMP crammed itself chock full of society's nonsystematized political values and interests. In this disorderly warehouse there were, cluttered one over another, old-fashioned Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist cabinets, as well as Socialist-Liberal easy chairs that contained imported parts and materials and were polished to a bright gloss.

One of the groups pressed into a corner is composed of the ambitious party members of the Late Kadar Period.... This is the upper middle class of society which tied its prosperity and careers to joining the power oligarchies, and which, by belonging to the MSZMP, obtained top posts at enterprises, on large-scale farms, and in the state apparatus.

Although pressed into a corner, they nevertheless still wield considerable economic, political, and military influence. Perhaps the most influence within the party and the country.... They do not even have to resort to force. It is enough for them to use their present economic preponderance and the tools available to the large enterprises, banks, and state administration that they head, against an unprepared and weak opposition, and, sadder still, against a defenseless society.

Another group within the MSZMP seems to be its intellectuals. Here we find, side by side, liberal socialists, Imre Nagy national Communists, and reform Communists. They are young and farther removed from the centers of political decisionmaking. A significant proportion of these intellectuals constituted the opposition within the party in the Late Kadar Period. But was there such an animal at all? Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of party dissidents, because there was no unified opposition within the party.

This group is a significant minority within the present MSZMP. Had it launched a separate movement—at

least at the level of a platform within the party—in the autumn of 1988 after the Arad meeting, or at the beginning of 1989 when 1956 was rehabilitated and the principle of political pluralism was recognized, then this platform or faction would have had a good chance of either transforming the MSZMP or forming a new political party.

But who makes up the party's backbone? Those who joined the party in the Middle Kadar Period, the successful and positive Kadar Period. Those who from the mid-1960's to the mid-1980's accepted and confirmed—by their entire life-style, their relationships with family and friends and at their workplace, and their system of values—Kadar's policy aimed at the common middle-of-the-roader: slow but certain growth, a peaceful private life, a practical approach to matters, a safe workplace, and social security. Let us not forget that the MSZMP of the Middle Kadar Period was not a party of the elite, and not even a party of the apparatuses, but a party of the common man. It was not only Kadar's personal style, but the style of Kadar's MSZMP, that the aspirations and feelings of the man in the street, of the common man, had to be articulated and fulfilled. An apartment, a lot, a car, the opportunity to travel abroad, a bit of private enterprise, social peace, and not much politics—all this attracted common people in the hundreds of thousands to Kadar's MSZMP. The large enterprise worker who hoed his weekend lot, and his secretary wife, felt at home in Kadar's party that was gradually becoming Social Democratic, because they rendered unto politics only as much as politics demanded of them, and they received from politics exactly what they expected: to be left alone.

The heroes of the Early Kadar Period (1956-62), the members of the Munnich Circle or of the former Rakosi clique, constitute a scattered minority whose sad role is mostly that of political bogeymen. Disappointed former party workers, their apparatuses, and the worker cadres who fought many battles and lived through many disasters, look upon the present MSZMP with understandable bitterness. This diffuse mass does not resemble in any way the center of a movement that wants to attain the utopia of communism or that would be able to wield power practically.

What will happen to this party at its extraordinary congress and, later, in the elections? I could restate this question s follows: What will be left of this party? With whom will it be able to enter into a coalition? Who will want to form a coalition with it?

One possibility is that the present party leadership might maintain a sham unity, although the power alignment will be changing. The bad compromises on personnel and the ad hoc agreements will be retained in the leaderships at the various levels, where the leaders will hate each other's guts and will be wooing each other's groups. Brains, requirements, and nobility of character will not count, and only common stupidity will prevail. The Pozsgay camp will be forced to gain the backing of the party's elector oligarchs (the county and municipal

party secretaries, chief executives of large enterprises, state officials, and the petty caesars of the mass media) for any hope of success in the party elections. The oligarchs are seeking someone else in place of Grosz to represent them and are desperately smiling at the reformers or are flirting with the party of the "common man."

The leaders sinking into bad compromises know very well that a debate on basic issues would immediately split the party asunder and would reveal that the groups of party members are farther apart from one another than from nonmembers. Naturally, there can be no real program for such a compromise, because members with conflicting interests and systems of values can only agree to disagree. A party built on sham unity would merely have the appearance of being a party. It would not be a movement, a political force with a program and system of values, but merely a remnant of power. A black hole, a self-consuming heavenly body. A certain loser in a truly free election.... If for geopolitical reasons, under Soviet and Western pressure, the party does get into a coalition, it would be treated there as an involuntary burden, as surplus baggage, the first to be discarded.

Let us assume the victory of the party barons, or of the party of barons, at the extraordinary congress. The chief executives of large enterprises and the county and municipal leaders would tire of the empty talk about democracy and framing of a new Constitution, of brief liberal monetary programs devised by Medgyessy clones, and would propose a new compromise. With wage indexing and economic rehabilitation for the workers of large plants so that they need not fear inflation and unemployment; with open agreements between enterprises and banks to replace indicative central planning and fiscal regulation as well as market forces; with concessions for middle-class consumers on import duties, foreign-exchange regulations, and working abroad; and with provisions to satisfy the material demands (for buildings, telephones, newspapers, and motor vehicles) of the opposition parties. A compromise with the local labor elites.

For anyone wishing to study bad compromises with party oligarchs and labor elites, it is enough to go to Yugoslavia where the federation's member republics, as local baronies, principalities, and khanates of varying sizes have been operating the outlined system for years. This oligarchy fought against the Rakowski government, marched with the official trade unions and partially with Solidarity.... And Li Peng's violent action also reflects the interests of the chiefs of China's northern and central provinces, and of the managers of Mao's rust bowls, for whom competition in the marketplace poses a grave danger, although they do not want central planning and arbitrariness in exercising administrative authority.

We will compromise as much as possible, but we will strike a blow when there is no more room to compromise. The factory, the land, the city and village, and the right to negotiate with foreign partners are ours.... Let

there be no mistake. The question here is not the property of the party-state, but the ownership and control rights of an elite that makes use of the party and state to exercise these rights. If the condition for maintaining his large plant barony is that the chief executive must be a member of the MSZMP, then fine. But if to do so he has to join the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] or the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], then that is no problem either. The essential thing is to preserve the privileged ownership and power mechanism for controlling the large enterprise, county, and city.

And what if the liberal socialist-reform Communist team wins with the help of a group of the oligarchs? If the market and democratization values of the reform democrats score a resounding victory? Needless to say, that would be the best from the country's point of view. The sad thing, however, is that this grouping not only lacks a clear picture of a future democratic system and of a future Socialist Party's tasks, but it has no idea even of the transition to such a system.

The oligarchic group knows who should own the factory, the land, the school, and the hospital. It should.... But the reform circles, or specifically Imre Pozsgay and Matyas Szuros, are just guessing whose property and power they are talking about, and to whom this property and power should be transferred, and in what form. They are thinking in terms of abstract and nonexistent state property, which a likewise abstract society should put to use democratically, with the efficiency of the marketplace, yet with worker participation.

Will this group—unprepared as it is to fight the big boys, lacking in mass support, and able to offer practically nothing positive for the immediate future—dare to oppose its own oligarchy? It could recruit mass support within the party from among Kadar's common people; but they in turn would fare worse, rather than better, in the initial stage of the economy's modernization. Within the MSZMP this path of modernization has the support of only some groups of intellectuals. The present and potential entrepreneurs in the cities and villages are strengthening the opposition or at least are suspicious of the completely unreliable MSZMP. It is no accident that Imre Pozsgay is seeking coalition partners in the Social Democrats and the MDF, in parties which perhaps might attract the mass that could supplement, and propel, the MSZMP's progressive socialist intelligentsia.

In this respect, the most serious competition facing this wing of the MSZMP comes from the SZDSZ. However, the SZDSZ is plagued by the same shortcoming. Its liberal modernization program appeals to intellectuals but lacks public support. The liberal socialist wing of the MSZMP wants to gain for a governing coalition the center-party masses of its own party, and particularly the Social Democratic and MDF masses who are leaning toward the center and are more mobile and enterprising; the SZDSZ wants to win them for a coalition of the opposition. Without external center-party support, neither can become an influential party. It follows from the



nature of things that, for this very reason, the sharpest clashes in the election campaign can be expected between the MSZMP radicals and the SZDSZ, and these clashes have already begun.

At the extraordinary congress, could the MSZMP become the party of the common man, a party that calls for security, stability, and social peace? I believe that Rezso Nyers is attempting to move the party that is drowning in the repetition of the word reform in this direction. As opposed to the oligarchs and modernizing radicals, he wants to let a middle-of-the-road MSZMP have its say, a party that expects small but safe steps.

What this is all about is the crowning of Kadar's social democratization of Eastern Europe. There is no display of fireworks by the intellectuals, no cocky self-assurance of the oligarchs. There is instead attention to detail within the party organizations in the shops and offices, the perception of everyday life.... If Rezso Nyers were able to find within the party, and team up with, blue-collar politicians from Angyalfold or Szeged, and small entrepreneurs who acknowledge the positive Kadarism of the 1960's and 1970's, then he could transform the MSZMP at least partially into a party of the common man. He could find that party's national identity in the Hungarian reform model. It is no accident that Rezso Nyers perceives as his coalition partners the Small-holders and the Social Democrats, who are likewise turning toward the common man.

If this change were to occur, then the MSZMP would become a typical middle-of-the road people's party, within which the populist or technocratic oligarchy that formerly held power would become merely a narrow fringe, and so would the radical, party-dissident, liberal socialists, and reform Communists. The MSZMP of the common man would function in a somewhat old-fashioned manner, traditionally, with patriarchal liberalism. Although this would slow down the pace of modernization, the party could hope to win electoral support among the masses.... It will be a realistic coalition partner. Given the opportunity and time, it will pursue a Kreisky-type bargaining policy of 20 years ago. The intellectuals will ridicule it, but that could also win it more votes.... If, with primitive simplicity, it offers cooperative or semiprivate ownership to hundreds of thousands, then it will be able to face the voters. If it pursues, in place of Grosz's policy, a more assertive national policy in relations with the two superpowers and the neighboring countries, then as a coalition partner it will be nothing to sneeze at.

No greater tragedy could befall the country than the MSZMP's collapse in the middle of a transition. In that case there would hardly be a peaceful transition. But there would be, first, an economic emergency, then a political one and finally, martial law. Today the three superpowers that determine Hungary's fate—the Soviet Union, the United States, and the now-forming European Community, any one of which would be able to

destroy us militarily or economically—are equally interested in a peaceful transition. They all know that the tacit or open agreement among them regarding Hungary's political, economic, and military status can be realized only if in the transition there is an MSZMP that wields an acceptable degree of influence and is capable of becoming a coalition partner. In the vacuum that would arise with the MSZMP's collapse there would be no suitable political force acceptable to all three superpowers. And a political vacuum cannot exist permanently.

### Entrepreneurs' Political Involvement Discussed

25000448a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 2 Sep 89 pp 68-69

[Interview with Peter Szirmai, National Association of Entrepreneurs copresident, by Gergely Fahidi: "VOSZ and Politics: To See and Be Seen"; date and place not given]

[Text] The National Association of Entrepreneurs [VOSZ] has developed a program which attempts to respond to political problems, in addition to the country's economic problems. The program title is "Let's Not Become Poorer, or: There Is Another Alternative." We asked VOSZ copresident Peter Szirmai why they are not satisfied with the direct protection of entrepreneurs' interests.

[HVG] Why do you want to become involved in national political issues? Wouldn't your members, the entrepreneurs, be satisfied if the state would let them operate undisturbed? Couldn't you wait with your political demands until after you satisfy your economic ambitions?

[Szirmai] This would have been a fair question, let's say, in 1982. In those days the Hungarian entrepreneur could have made a living out of the fact that the other sectors of the economy were having difficulties and functioning badly. By 1989 the situation has fundamentally changed. Not even the entrepreneurs can prosper in a Hungary burdened with strikes, and with its economy falling apart. The insolvency and solvency crises of large enterprises are gradually striking small enterprises, which are much more sensitive to costs. The big ones can force the smaller ones to provide credit under constraint, but the smaller ones cannot do the same to the big ones. For this reason VOSZ as an organization has had to recognize that the interests of entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished from the public good as a whole. On the other hand, Europe will be united in 1992, and Hungary will be "non-Europe." Our program describes in detail the things that should be done in the interest of catching up with the West. In many of its elements this program is similar to the program of a political organization or a party, e.g. a stimulating rather than a restrictive economic policy, abandonment of the "three market" outlook, and development of the infrastructure, particularly of education. This similarity is understandable, because

Hungarian society is running on a constrained path, in which several questions have only one rational answer, and there are no alternatives. But there is a difference in outlook on the issue of proprietary reform, as compared to the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] for instance. In our view, we need not seek owners in every area of the economy because we, the small entrepreneurs, are here. We must overcome excessive nationalization by establishing optimum plant sizes and by increasing the number of actors in the marketplace. This concept could accommodate a situation in which even 100 percent of the energy and banking spheres remain under state ownership.

[HVG] Many feel that the MSZMP, or rather those in power, have found the "owners" in the previous heads of enterprises, who call themselves managers these days. Allow me to quote Economics Professor Tamas Bacskai: "Only through the entrepreneurs' cooperation with the intelligentsia, which sympathizes with the entrepreneurs, can the reign of the managerial stratum intertwined with the state administration be toppled, a stratum which thus far has torpedoed any and all progressive initiative."

[Szirmai] In my view Bacskai's statement is not well grounded. Class conditions are not this clear. Elemer Hankiss' concept is at least this true. According to him the children of party secretaries will make the "most successful" entrepreneurs; the old elite salvages its bureaucratic power in the form of economic power, through entrepreneurship. I am not attacking the stratum of large enterprise heads, because by necessity, all generalizations are false. Instead I am criticizing a social structure in which "managers" can enforce their interests so easily and without obstacles. But I feel that, through the entirely absurd conditions through which managers today find themselves owners and receive millions of forints in premium payments, this stratum is seeing its final days in its traditional form. It is enjoying its final orgy in the logic of a planned economy.

Workers' autonomy could have been an alternative. But this could not even really be tested, because at the time enterprise councils were formed they were given the role of voting machines. One thing is certain in my view: Workers' autonomy cannot be reconcile with capitalist production. It is for this reason that VOSZ has taken a clear position. It chooses the development of private ownership.

[HVG] With this decision you are expressing an opinion on a key political issue. However, if I am correct, according to a position adopted by the presidium, VOSZ does not intend to become directly involved in politics.

[Szirmai] No. According to that decision VOSZ will not become a political organization or a party.

[HVG] Even though according to an MTI report plans call for the establishment of an entrepreneurs' party this fall.

[Szirmai] I heard about that, but as far as I know that will be an organization of small tradesmen and small merchants. Insofar as the 4,000 members of VOSZ are concerned, their views are rather heterogeneous. Many of them are members of the Smallholders Party, the Hungarian Social Democratic Party and of the MSZMP. If VOSZ became a party, those members would have to leave one of the organizations.

Accordingly, we chose a different path of political involvement. In the next session of Parliament a representative will probably propose the establishment of a entrepreneurs' faction composed of representatives, and we support that. Henceforth meetings between VOSZ and the government will take place on a regular basis. The government has committed itself to reporting VOSZ' separate views in proposing legislation to Parliament, provided that the proposed law affects entrepreneurs and that VOSZ maintains a separate opinion.

[HVG] Accordingly, you have discarded the idea of establishing a separate party. But are you going to cooperate formally with any of the new political parties?

[Szirmai] In our experience, the economic positions of these parties are so undeveloped that it would not be profitable for VOSZ to tie itself to any of them. This, of course, does not mean seclusion. We participate as observers at the national triangle negotiations, as an independent expert organization. At the request of the Alliance of Free Democrats I myself contribute to their program development, even though I am a member of the MSZMP. But I wish to emphasize that this does not constitute an alliance between the organizations, even at the personal level.

[HVG] How did your members react to your president's, Janos Palotas', promise that VOSZ would be willing to finance live broadcasts from Parliament if necessary?

[Szirmai] The idea that VOSZ would pay for these broadcasts is out of the question. We could not do this, because our annual revenues from membership dues will amount to a total of 16 million forints, while broadcasting each session of Parliament would cost several million forints. All we have committed ourselves to is finding prospective sponsors, organizing financing, and VOSZ putting its name to all this. Negotiations have begun already, but we do not wish to publicize the details. Incidentally, we have not received a response as to the merits of this matter from TV management. In the next few sessions of Parliament the legislature will deal with several important issues—e.g., changes in the tax system—which will affect the fundamental existential situation of entrepreneurs for years to come. We want to know not only the substance of the decision, but also what each representative said, and how he or she voted.

[HVG] Your membership must be pleased that you are not spending a single penny of their membership dues for this purpose. But don't you think that elsewhere the fact that you intend to make grandiose payments from someone else's pocket will not be well taken?

[Szirmai] VOSZ contributed only 500,000 forints to the VOSZ foundation, which now has 6 million forints. Also at the Fall Budapest International Fair 90 percent of the expenses related to the introduction of VOSZ members will be paid for by the Ministry of Commerce. Our organization will not be wealthy enough for many years to come, as the Economic Chamber and the National Association of Small Tradesmen are. For this reason we can agree only to perform the role of catalyst. I do not feel that there is anything dishonest about that. It would be dishonest if for example we used money received from the Ministry of Commerce for the Budapest International Fair to finance television broadcasts. This, however, cannot take place.

### Entrepreneurs' Faction in Parliament

25000447a Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
8 Sep 89 p 5

[Text] Twenty National Assembly representatives have established the entrepreneurs' faction in Parliament. The faction's intent is to change the government's, and primarily the Finance Ministry's outlook. The faction is open and has already enlisted a number of supporters. Among them are the National Association of Entrepreneurs, the National Association of Small Tradesmen, the Society for the World's Fair, and several small cooperatives, limited liability corporations, and stock corporations.

National Assembly Representative Laszlo Morvay told an MTI reporter that the world's fair provided the basic idea for the establishment of the faction, but that the faction's endeavors far transcend world's fair issues. Members of the faction believe that economic recovery cannot be accomplished through restrictive policies. The bottomless purse of the state budget cannot be filled endlessly. In order to accomplish change, however, a certain outlook is needed that abandons the idea of the budget playing a central role, that considers the halting of indebtedness and the strengthening of the entrepreneurial spirit to be one of its primary concerns, and that opens broad avenues for opportunities for producers to make large profits with little investment.

### City Demands Return of Title to Soviet Barracks

25000427b Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
24 Aug 89 p 5

[Text] In an open letter to Miklos Nemeth, Kecskemet City Council Chairman Mihaly Adorjan had the following to say:

"The people of Kecskemet are filled with expectation as a result of news reports that the city of Kecskemet is to experience the partial removal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. The barracks to be vacated are important to the public not only because of their favorable location from a structural standpoint, but also because they are part of the city's history.

"This group of buildings was built by the city between 1894 and 1897. Building plans were prepared by the Odon Lechner and Gyula Partos architectural organization, with the personal involvement of the two grand masters.

"Their favorable location, as well as other features, render these buildings suitable for higher education, foreign tourism, foreign therapeutic visits, and the pursuit of leisure time and sporting activities.

"These barracks were owned by the city of Kecskemet until 1973. It was the city of Kecskemet that constructed these buildings. At that time, however, the buildings were expropriated from land registry insert No 5400 which contains city properties, by virtue of land office determination No 3996/1973, delivered exclusively to the Ministry of Defense. The city received no pecuniary or other compensation.

"Accordingly, our city does not wish to surrender the idea of regaining possession of this group of buildings and related structures."

## POLAND

### Call To Liberalize Right-to-Assembly Law

26000681a Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
17 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by Wanda Falkowska: "An Obsolete Law"]

[Text] The right to free assembly is one of the basic rights of man. We all recall the breakup of peaceful demonstrations by the militia. This makes us aware of the need for urgent change in the right to assembly law. A draft law has already been drawn up, authored by scholars from the UW [Warsaw University] Law Department. We are waiting for it to be brought before the Sejm.

As the system of Polish law is being reworked, there is also talk of updating the 1962 law on the right to assembly. The man on the street is normally not interested in this sphere of legal regulations and he does not know that various restrictions apply to him in this area. For example, he is free to have a wedding or a fancy birthday party. However, if he wants to hold a meeting of his fellow workers, he must inform the administrative authorities, and his request is subject to denial.

Twice, however, the right to assembly law succeeded in sparking the interest of all. The first time was in 1981, when there occurred a memorable blockade of the traffic circle in the center of Warsaw by Solidarity. The authorities intended to treat the blockade as illegal. Suddenly, it turned out that the Warsaw fathers were in error. The 1962 law excluded trade unions from all restrictions, putting them on an equal par with the state authorities, the party and political parties. After all, could the legislators in 1962 have imagined that an independent trade union might arise some day that would begin to take advantage of the rights granted to law-abiding



unions? Once again, the issue of the right to assembly law surfaced recently, as the subject of the first deputy interpellation during the 10th term of the Sejm, following an attack on a peaceful KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] picket by law-and-order forces. Z. Pudysz, deputy MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] minister, responded to the deputies by claiming that the demonstration was illegal because its participants had not obtained the permission required by the 1962 regulations. Under duress, however, he admitted that these regulations are obsolete, and the MSW is working to prepare new ones. Z. Pudysz did not add, however, that the work on the regulations has been going on for a long time. The developers of the law code at MSW yielded to the general trend that took over all legislative bodies in the PRL. The lawmaking process is exceedingly lengthy, unless the authorities need a law to be passed quickly, in which case it is expedited very quickly.

Meanwhile, four scholars from the UW Law Department: Lech Falandysz, Malgorzata Fuszara, Jacek Kurczewski and Krystyna Pawlowicz showed that a draft can be prepared quickly and efficiently. Their version of the right to assembly law is already done. Apparently, the authorities considered all of the requirements that must be met by the new right to assembly law.

At the same time, it is interesting that their draft takes into account the proposals contained in the Senate resolution passed on 5 July in conjunction with an attack on KPN demonstrators. The resolution stipulates that citizens must be entitled to the right to gather together peaceably and demonstrate, and the task of the militia should be to protect such assemblies and not to disperse them.

According to the draft law, all citizens are permitted to demonstrate peaceably without weapons. The state guarantees and protects the freedom to demonstrate. This does not mean, however, that the creators of the draft law permit complete license in this area. The draft law likewise contains the restrictions that are stipulated in the regulations of all civilized states. For example, the administrative authorities must be informed regarding open air demonstrations. Every decision prohibiting an assembly, however, must be justified in writing and must be based on the regulations of the law, and not on a discretionary decision made by an official (in consideration of security or a threat to health or life). The organization of assemblies that are contrary to the law or the disruption of an assembly is treated as an offense punishable by law.

We should expect the draft law of the Warsaw scholars to reach the good graces of the marshal through the initiative of the Citizen's Parliamentary Club. It is high time that the outdated law on the right to assembly that is 27 years old ceased to be binding.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### U.S. Senate Resolution, Paraga Issue Reviewed

28000172 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
15 Aug 89 pp 26-27

[Article by Zorica Nikolic: "Paraga as a Screen: How a Forgotten Incident Has Been Resurrected To Defend Human Rights in Yugoslavia"]

[Text] The U.S. Senate Resolution passed during the last hour of the last day before the annual Congressional vacation began is unknown to the United States, it seems. Being merely an ephemeral Congressional episode, it was not noticed by the U.S. media (either), while the incident was given prime space and time in all mass media on the other side of the already delicately balanced relations, in Yugoslavia. But persons who followed the events in Zagreb municipal court a little more than 2 years ago (in April 1987) are certainly not surprised. The same thing occurred, but in the opposite direction, when an entirely ordinary, standard, and in many respects trivial trial was held in this court. That is, an entirely insignificant trial in a really insignificant case, but one which from the very beginning was raised outside Yugoslavia by various manipulations to the level of a first-class anti-Yugoslav media sensation, and of course was presented as such at its finish. The pomp and circumstance accompanying the trial is best illustrated by the photograph of the gallery. In addition to domestic and foreign newsmen, the figures appearing in it were mostly former (political) prisoners and diplomatic representatives of certain countries friendly to us. Even at that time farsighted persons suspected that it might be a question primarily of an attempt at political involvement and unique pressure on the court, and only secondarily of concern for an accused Yugoslav citizen. This presentiment was confirmed on Capitol Hill today by the passage of a resolution "supporting the efforts of Dobroslav Paraga to strengthen human rights in Yugoslavia." According to comments by informed observers, the Senate hereby "opened the way for involvement in the internal affairs of SFRY," by making "certain statements which, to put it as mildly as possible, are doubtful." They further believe that "in any event the previously stable relationships between the United States and SFRY have taken on a new burden which threatens the already strained bilateral tie with its unpleasant scope."

Without going into the wording of the resolution (allegedly it passed by a narrow margin and a symbolically small number of senators voted for it), we can say that it unquestionably has had a negative effect on Yugoslav-American relationships. Following are some typical comments. "In view of everything taking place in Yugoslavia in the process of further democratization and further widening of human rights and freedoms, along with remedying of past injustices, being carried out precisely by the wielders of power, resolutions of this kind are empty gestures. Moreover, they generate counterproductive action, because at this time they subjectively and

objectively encourage forces of disintegration in Yugoslavia threatening the internal unity of the country and tearing it down" (BORBA). "Unlike previous 'Yugoslav amendments,' which carefully weighed every word, this resolution veers into turbid and turbulent waters which even yesterday were inconceivable for American-Yugoslav relations" (VJESNIK). "Why have relations with Yugoslavia become so little important that virtually no one on the American side, either among the public or in government, feels the need to oppose such political scheming? Has Yugoslavia's standing fallen so low that almost every congressman or senator who depends on emigre votes offers resolutions as allegedly in the higher interest of the United States as if no one any longer cares about the traditionally good relations between the two countries?" (POLITIKA).

### Falsified Petition

It is easy to guess how much such resolutions disrupt bilateral relations, how much they contribute to destabilization of critical Yugoslav political situations, and, lastly, whom they really benefit, especially when it is learned that the senate document centers attention on "an activist in the movement for human rights" who (in 1981) was convicted of hostile activities. Specifically, the District Court Council in Zagreb found Dobroslov Paraga guilty, as stated in the sentence, "of associating with Stjepan Bilandzic, a representative of Ustasha terrorist organizations, in July 1980, in Cologne in the Federal Republic of Germany, and of maintaining constant contact with this person for the purpose of engaging in hostile activities against the SFRY. In his dwelling in Cologne he gave 'information' on the 'political situation' in Zagreb and on the status of Croatian nationalists who had been discharged from their jobs, etc. He then received from Bilandzic a large amount of printed hostile materials that had been prepared by various Ustasha, terrorist, and emigre organizations, and illegally brought these materials into the country." Paraga was also pronounced guilty of inducing individual cultural and public workers by deception to sign a petition to the Office of President of the SFRY to enact a law giving amnesty to all persons who have committed criminal acts of a political nature. He reassured the majority of the persons whose signatures he requested by falsely representing himself to be a reporter for the publication POLET and stating that amnesty was being sought exclusively for perpetrators of verbal criminal acts of a political nature. However, he subsequently substituted a separate sheet of paper on which the text of the petition was written and introduced new subject matter into this text. In this way he requested amnesty also for perpetrators of the most serious criminal acts such as terrorism, espionage, and the like. Thus the document entitled "Amnesty for Persons Convicted of Committing Political Crimes" also reached the Madrid meeting of KEBS, and, according to the testimony of the signers themselves of the petition, not in its "original version" but probably as "modified" in some headquarters of an Ustasha

emigre organization. Even then Yugoslavia was classified as a country which persecutes, mistreats, and unjustifiably imprisons its citizens, so it is no wonder that today the resolution directs four by no means mild criticisms and demands at the Yugoslav government, including the demand that the government "guarantee its citizens fundamental human rights and freedoms." It is also stated that "Paraga went to the West to speak openly about violation of human rights in Yugoslavia." Just what did he say? This can be determined best from NOVA HRVATSKA, which was founded and sponsored by Ustasha emigres and, since Paraga is from Ljubljana (where he moved from Zagreb immediately after his release from prison in 1986), sent him from there under a tourist arrangement to Canada (by no means was he "driven from his home in Croatia" as is alleged in the resolution) and followed his meetings and appearances in forums from issue to issue. For example, a month ago the HRVATSKI TJEDNIK published a report on his talk to "honest Croats" in Chicago, in which, along with the inevitable description of his sufferings in Yugoslav prisons, he dealt a glancing blow to Ante Markovic (he cannot forgive him for having pronounced him guilty once before 70 foreign journalists, in his capacity as president of Croatia), Suvar, Bilic, Blazevic, and so on. Although he had no "close contact" with Milosevic, he has not forgotten him. As a well-informed Yugoslav dissident, he proclaimed him to be nothing more nor less than "a Balkan fuehrer" and stated that more than 250 persons died in the recent demonstrations in Kosovo. The CHICAGO DEFENDER once published an item which among other things describes the sufferings of the Croatian dissident in prison because he "refused to mourn for a dictator such as Tito" and then allegedly experienced a living hell which can only be compared to the one created by the Gestapo in Auschwitz and Dachau.

### Prison Bread

It is not just that these are pure fabrications. What is even more astonishing is that the resolution presents inaccurate and unverified facts. By assigning exceptional status to a person who was once convicted of hostile activities because of extreme Croatian nationalism (it also announces his arrival in Yugoslavia at the beginning of next year, in the belief that "it is the right time to wake up honest Croats to rouse themselves and begin work to create a new state"), Capitol Hill in reality is attaching great importance to a "mothballed case" by means of which as it were it seeks to relight a fire that has already gone out. After all, "verbal offenses" have been virtually eliminated in Yugoslavia (Paraga has been described mainly as a victim of Article 133, although he is known not to have spent 4 years in prison because of this "political violation" or because he collected signatures for a petition), there are no longer any Gulags (and it is also known to be inaccurate that after the Paraga interviews "a wave of threats spread over the world, and that our government opened Goli otok [prison] under world



pressure"), and there are not even any "dark, airless dungeons" in the Investigative Detention Center on Petrinjska ulica in Zagreb.

After all, we know that Paraga's tales have always been filled with details bolstering the thesis that the government wanted to kill him, and what is most important, conditions in the prisons reflect conditions in the state. Bearing in mind the sentence pronounced against Dobroslav Paraga the year before last (when he was placed on probation after being accused of spreading false rumors through the NOVA REVIJA and MLADINA published in Ljubljana), we remember the words of the chairman of the panel of judges, who in justifying the sentence stated that "I agree that there is no harder bread than prison bread, and no more violent social measure than imprisonment, because no one ever feels good in prison." In modern penology there is much more in programs and reports than is applied in practice, but it is far from what is told in Paraga's tale. The trouble is that the Senate resolution has set an unpleasant precedent in Belgrade-Washington relations.

[Box, p 27]

#### From the Dossier

Paraga was arrested on 21 November 1980 on suspicion of maintaining contact with members of fascist emigre organizations, and specifically with the Ustasa terrorist Stjepan Bilandzic, inspirer and organizer of many bombing attempts against Yugoslavia. He was also imprisoned for misusing the signatures of a petition sent to the Office of President of the SFRY and for grossly deceiving the signers of this petition. He was indicted in March 1981 and was tried in May of that year in the District Court in Zagreb. After the main hearing, in which 10 witnesses were examined and many pieces of evidence were presented, the court pronounced Paraga guilty and sentenced him to 3 years in prison (the Supreme Court of Croatia raised the sentence to 5 years and the Federal Court lowered it to 4 years). For a long time after the sentence (and repeatedly) it was speculated that Paraga had really been sentenced for collecting signatures for a petition and that his activity was, illegally, proclaimed to be criminal. However, the Supreme Court of Croatia, when considering Paraga's appeal of the original sentence, stated in the substantiation of its decision that "no one, including the accused Paraga, bears criminal responsibility for collecting signatures for a petition, but rather for misusing the results, which were based on a legal activity," that is, "for arbitrarily sending abroad an expanded version of the petition, along with his malicious and untrue commentary."

The validity of the 4-year sentence was upheld, and so Paraga was detained from 21 November 1980 when he was arrested to 21 November 1984 when he was released at the District Court Detention Center in Zagreb (from 21 November 1980 to 22 December 1981), the Rab-Gol otok Penal Institution (from 23 December 1981 to 10 November 1982), and the Lepoglava Penal Institution

(from 10 November 1982 to 21 November 1984). He tried to utilize this entire period to engage in the activities he pursued before his arrest, and understandably was in constant conflict with the basic assumptions of penological treatment. Skillfully playing the part of an ostensible democrat, humanist, and uncompromising fighter for human rights (that is, the rights of political prisoners), by his practical behavior he deliberately and grossly violated the provisions of internal prison order and endangered his life as well as his health by refusing to take food, sometimes in a downright masochistic manner. Thus, by writing petitions and stirring up the prisoners at any cost, he attempted to secure a special political prisoner status, considering himself the top defender of justice and legality.

#### Photo Captions

1. Rather than the "cold concrete cell (with no roof)" he claimed, for the first 3 days of his detention he was held apart from others, by order of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, in cell No 10 on the first floor of the detention center at Petrinjska ulica 10. The cell had central heating. Both the floor and the walls were tiled, and there were two wooden bunks with two coverlets, running water, and a toilet.

2. The famous opening shown us at one time at Goli otok, which according to Paraga was to be used to "immure and kill" one prisoner (Bruno Reketti), is really a place in an abandoned movie auditorium where there was once a cabinet for electric wiring. It is 20 centimeters deep, and even a child could not fit into it.

#### Ambassador to Poland Interviewed by Zagreb Weekly

28000180 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
29 Aug 89 pp 10-13

[Interview with Branko Puharic, Yugoslav ambassador to Poland, by Vjekoslav Krsnik: "We Were All Humiliated"; date and place not given]

[Text] [DANAS] In political, theoretical, scientific, and other circles of the public, it has been argued for a long time that the world socialist movement is in crisis. How do you look on the world dimension of that crisis from a capital where it is having such drastic repercussions, and how in that world context can one assess the position of the Yugoslav experience and its prospects?

[Puharic] It is not just the crisis of socialism that is being talked about today in the world, assessments and theses are quite widespread to the effect that this is a definitive historical defeat of socialism as a world system vis-a-vis capitalism and that in fact socialism is quite close to being finished. It is asserted in this connection that it is not just a question of the debacle of the Stalinist concept of the socialist state, but that the crisis of socialism is universal, that all the specific forms of socialism—Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav—are about to collapse, and

that reforms in the socialist countries have no chance whatsoever unless a radical move is made to change the basic social relation.

These views are neither isolated nor are they located solely on the terrain of bourgeois ideology; they have been rather outspoken and present in the theoretical reflections in certain countries of real socialism. I am among those who do not agree with these assessments, not because of ideological fanaticism, but because of an objective analysis of the failures and the scope of socialist ideas and socialist states. There is no room for an extensive analysis; in my opinion, we are looking at a kind of large crisis of socialism, something like what happened to capitalism in the 1930's. It is only now that the strength of socialist ideas and the historical values of socialism as a social model should demonstrate themselves. However, if the chances of getting out of the crisis are to materialize, certain truths need to be acknowledged and looked at, however embarrassing they might be. Capitalism has achieved a historical advantage precisely concerning two essential questions of social development, in the economic field and in the field of human rights, or, better put, the democratization of social relations in general. It is an unpleasant, but irrefutable fact that the level of dissatisfaction of the people, including the working class, with the situation in their own states, including the political systems, is today incomparably greater in the socialist than in the capitalist countries. Also, the question remains for reflection whether it is actually on a concept of Marxist theory of social development, particularly conceived as a dogma and mandatory set of formulas, that it is possible to find solutions to the problems of contemporary socialism, or must the subjective forces of socialism go further in meditation and theoretical examination of the way out of the present crisis and the creation of social prerequisites for the prosperous development of the socialist countries?

[DANAS] Nevertheless, in recent years there have been obvious efforts to carry out profound reforms in the socialist world precisely in the area of which you speak. How would you comment on those attempts?

[Puharic] The political, economic, and social reasons for the crisis of socialism vary from country to country. For example, in certain countries of real socialism the main generator of the crisis has been the general dissatisfaction of the masses with the results achieved so far in the development of their countries, a dissatisfaction which rejects socialism a priori as a framework for dialogue about the future. In those countries, there are strong organized oppositional forces which are trying to squeeze out socialism and Communists, looking upon the social reforms as a chance for an evolutionary transition from socialism to capitalism. There are also serious differences in the social position, significance, and strength of the socialist forces from country to country, as well as in the general balance of power of the political forces. To be sure, there are still a number of countries which portray the concept of the party state

and totalitarian communism as the only way for a socialist state to develop. It can be said that the USSR, Poland, and Hungary are at the focus of international attention precisely because of the powerfully expressed reformist aspirations and the attempt to overcome the historical mistakes and deformations of various kinds and to offer concepts and platforms that would create new historical opportunities for socialism in those countries. Regardless of the differences between the reforms in those three countries, their common denominator is a courageous and radical search for a way out of economic crises and a firm orientation toward accelerated and extensive democratization of social relations. Barriers have come down in a fashion unthinkable until yesterday, the dogmas and the monotony of the ideologies that prevailed until yesterday are being abandoned, mistakes and oversights are being admitted unequivocally, and visionary imaginings about a bright future are giving way to pragmatic searches for solutions to urgent problems in the state of crisis of those countries. The world is caught up in the changes and evolution in thinking, theories, ideas, and practice of the various reformist moves and processes. The emergence of Gorbachev and the new thinking is an immensely important and constructive historical fact, and there is no doubt that just as inauguration of socialism as a world system depended on the fate of the October Revolution, so today the future historical advancement of socialism on a world scale depends on the fate of perestroika.

[DANAS] In the context of developments like that in the socialist world, Yugoslav experience has in recent years moved to the margin; our crisis has diminished international interest in self-management as a possible direction of socialist searches for new models, and the current events on our country's political scene have essentially and radically diminished our prestige in the world.

[Puharic] In a global view, there are quite serious and significant differences in causes and consequences when we compare our crisis and the crisis in the other socialist countries. What we have in our favor and the great advantage we have over the others is the fact that in our country there is far less dissatisfaction with the overall results of socialist construction than is the case in certain countries. Our nationalities and our citizens mainly do not have an adverse attitude toward socialism, but rather toward the mistakes that have brought about adverse trends in our country's development. People are in fact dissatisfied that they are not living as well as they did before, not because they have never lived well. This is an essential and important difference. That is the main reason why an anticommunist opposition as a political force in partnership has not yet been formed on that dissatisfaction, at least so far. We have had strong articulation of dissatisfaction with the leadership of the party and the state because of their inability to change the state of affairs. But that is not dissatisfaction with socialism as a political system. I can say without exaggerating at all that socialism as a consciousness and as an idea is less threatened in Yugoslavia than in any other

socialist country. Which is in fact logical, since our results in many areas of social development have been the greatest. The manifestations of the Yugoslav crisis are essentially different from those in the other countries.

[DANAS] What is the impression of the Yugoslav crisis as seen from Warsaw?

[Puharic] There is no doubt that Yugoslavia today is one of the most controversial countries in Europe and the world. The world is rather confused by what is happening in our country; many things are not understood, and many things are not approved. In any case, our political rating is not high, and the prevailing fears have to do with what will happen to Yugoslavia. I can state with full responsibility that the most frequent question which has been put to me in recent years by my colleagues in the diplomatic corps is whether Yugoslavia will collapse as a state? I am not overdramatizing things; indeed, I have the impression that there is a growing fear in Europe of the Balkan syndrome. Europe is simply afraid that an adverse and drastic development of the Yugoslav crisis could threaten the favorable processes in Europe and the policy of the common home in Europe. Should things in our country go as badly as they have gone up to now, I am not far from thinking that this could internationalize our problem and open up the so-called question of Yugoslavia even in Europe. Unless we sober up, unless we ourselves become afraid of the abyss to which we have come close, we may end up as the subject matter of some Geneva peace conference. We are a complicated country, that is an indisputable fact. But the way in which we have been trying to solve our problems is taking us further and further from Europe in terms of civilized life and political and cultural values and throwing us back to the Balkan junk room of primitivism and backwardness. There are methods of political dialogue that not only exist, but predominate, on our political scene which border on the lowest kind of bad taste and lack of culture. It is true that we do not have a tradition of political tolerance, down through history our disputes have always been resolved brutally. We must be aware that otherwise there is no dialogue either about the past or the present, nor even the future. Political tolerance is not a fad, it is a philosophy by which the people live. In a country with such differing interests, political, economic, cultural, religious, and every other kind possible, nothing can be resolved without a highly developed sensitivity for the arguments and interests of the other person; it is not possible to live in such a country without democratic articulation of differences of all kinds. We were the first in the socialist world to initiate reforms and to look for new pathways and democratic directions. Where are we today?

[DANAS] Does that mean that in your opinion there are also other options?

[Puharic] As far as the world goes, I am deeply convinced that the international public sees the Yugoslav crisis and its problems in terms of a solution within the existing

Yugoslav state structure. Everything else would be a dangerous escapade for the world. As far as our domestic scene is concerned, though, it can be stated with certainty that the broadest masses of people are in favor of Yugoslavia, but it is not precluded that within political structures there are individuals and groups who are already thinking about solutions outside the Yugoslav option or have indeed gone even far beyond that.

Our controversies remain, our problems are piling up. Inflamed passions and emotions cannot serve as the basis for finding ways out of the crisis. The political people who out of a deficiency of responsibility do not see where this is leading us remain petty provincial politicians who might be stars for the moment on waves of ethnic euphoria, but sooner or later they will disappear because they are marginal figures, and they will be remembered only for the evil and the damage they caused. Nevertheless, viewed from Warsaw, one does not see what I have felt during my last several private or official visits to the country. Our political divisions have infected people, their families, their societies, the population is being corrupted, and its lowest instincts are being awakened. That is what one fears the most. When politicians quarrel, you can change them at some congress or plenum, but when there is bad blood between nationalities, that takes centuries to heal.

Our current social situation is a humiliation for all of us regardless of whether we are in the country or outside it, whether we differ in religion or in ideas, in belonging to this or that nationality or ethnic minority.

[DANAS] The controversies over assessment of the crisis of Yugoslav socialism are bound up with the assessments that have recently been more and more outspoken concerning a reexamination of the historical role of the author of this direction, Josip Broz Tito. How do you look on that campaign, to what extent does it contain a demand for indispensable innovations in keeping with the times, and to what extent is this an appeal to destroy everything that Yugoslavia achieved under his leadership?

[Puharic] I am a man who was fascinated by Tito's personality; I still am today. However, I feel that dead men cannot run a country and we will not solve our problems by competing as to who can mention Tito's name more often.

It simply is not possible today to run either the country or the party the way Tito did it. First of all because there is no figure of Tito's caliber, nor can there be, and then at the same time the historical conditions do not exist for that. And then social conditions in Yugoslavia and the world have changed so much that under the conditions today, even if we wanted to, it would be impossible to implement a political philosophy of managing the affairs of state in Tito's manner. Tito took maximum advantage of Yugoslavia's placement as a bridge between East and West in striving to affirm the policy of peaceful coexistence, but at the same time paying first attention to our



country's interests of state. At some time in the past, I wrote something which I can repeat now: It will be difficult in the future of humanity to repeat a situation in which such a small country plays such an immense role in world affairs as was the case with Tito's Yugoslavia. The world is different today. Yugoslavia is different today, and Tito is no longer there. Tito belongs to history, and our attitude toward him should be built on the cultural traditions of civilized peoples with respect to the attitude toward great historical figures. Something like the way the English look on Churchill, the French look on de Gaulle, or the Indians look on Gandhi. This does not mean that we should not do scientific and critical studies of Tito's role and of his decisions in the various stages of our revolution. One thing is certain, three things remain which neither time nor other kinds of distance can take away from the historical importance of Tito as a figure. He remains one of the greatest wartime commanders of World War II, the first man who resisted Stalin, and one of the main founders of the movement of the nonaligned. Whatever comes of that movement in the future, whether or not the conference in Belgrade finds a formula to bring it up-to-date, it remains beyond all doubt that the activities and ideas of the nonaligned deserve credit for the enormous progress in international relations in recent decades. Tito remains one of the most distinguished figures and statesmen in this century, as in fact his funeral illustratively confirmed.

Nevertheless, in answering your question, I must express the impression that most of the articles being published today on the topic of Tito's role are motivated more by a desire to detract from his importance than to draw certain lessons from a study of his contribution as a statesman and revolutionary. I am bothered most by the writings of Tito's former collaborators who are attempting to cover over their own despotism in running their own regions by making critical observations concerning Tito's activity. Some people cannot give up those habits even today. Even though I don't like it, it remains a real fact that Tito has become yet another of our divisions.

[DANAS] As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, a sizable portion of political energy is expended over the question of its constitution, over whether it will be federalist, and so on. How do you view that problem?

[Puharic] Even on those matters, we are unable to overcome the hackneyed clichés and stereotypes, especially in the political sphere. In the press and journalism, there have been very serious articles by well-known scholars on this topic, but unfortunately they get lost in the atmosphere of intolerance and sharp political divisions. In that kind of heedless name-calling, in which people are discredited if they do not agree, it is hardly possible to conduct any creative discussion. As far as I am concerned, I think that the key thing in these discussions is to reverse the order of things. We have to build a common state which the world perceives as a modern state, with which it can correspond through all channels

without problems, not a state which is organized in such a complicated way that communication with it is very problematical. I think that Yugoslavia cannot be a simple sum of national states which function as a fluid federal community, but neither can Yugoslavia be a centralist federation which does not respect the fact that the question of the political equality of its nationalities and ethnic minorities is a precondition of its political existence. In reaching agreement about the powers of the Federation, our point of departure should be those of its autonomous functions which are indispensable so that we can represent ourselves as a serious state in contacts with the world. We have had enough bad experience for it not to be a problem of enumerating those matters on which a unified approach to the world is a precondition for normal intergovernmental contact. Once we get out of our provincial shell and ethnic narrow-mindedness, there will be no problem finding ways of providing the prerequisites for reaffirmation of Yugoslav statehood. In the building of internal relations, we should guarantee equality on the key questions of the political-governmental relations of all the republics, while economic equality signifies creating an economic system in which the conditions for all are equal, in which a market economy guarantees correspondence with the main characteristics of world and European economic regulations and development policy. The differences that might arise should be exclusively the result of a differing level of efficiency of the various economic entities and groupings. The economic policy of the government is built on a strategy of adapting to world standards and criteria, not on a policy of compromise to reconcile the particularistic economic interests of the federal units. I favor a modern Yugoslav state with a federal system, one that with its government, legal, political, and economic structure would be able to take part in relations of every kind with the world community, but above all with the European international community.

In the context of this reflection, of course, the so-called idea of the asymmetrical federation, which is a specific theoretical invention made in the Balkans [the previous three words in English in the original] can serve only to compromise Yugoslavia further. I can well imagine that in a modern Yugoslav federation there are differences in the legal organization of the various federal units, but it is absurd for there to be two law-based states and four party-based states or the other way around in that federation, and the world would laugh at that idea. Viewed objectively, this is a kind of offering of a transitional period for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia as a state.

[DANAS] In the context of these discussions, what do you make of the idea about political pluralism as it has been formulated in Slovenia, institutionally impeded in Croatia, and accepted with serious reserve in most of the other republics. Was the LC afraid of entering into competition with other ideas, or is it a fear of giving up power in that competition?

[Puharic] When I speak about political pluralism, I am referring to pluralism of the nonparty type, and I agree with those who reject the multiparty system as the optimum alternative under our social conditions. In our country, the question of trade union pluralism and reform of the trade union movement is an extremely important question, one which has been left to one side in the discussions to date. I would recall that certain progressive prewar trade unions, for example, the printing industry workers or metalworkers, played an important role in shaping the idea of Yugoslavia. I am certain that certain Yugoslav trade unions, independent and organized on a class basis, would play a very constructive role toward integration of the Yugoslav interest or toward synthesis, which is the modern and incomprehensible term used today.

If the LC does not carry out its own transformation toward abandoning the monopoly on power, that process will bypass it or, more likely, overrun it. Under the conditions of a law-based state, the crisis of the party would be its own problem and would not essentially disrupt the functioning of the state, and should this occur in a social climate of political pluralism and competition of ideas, the LC would not be able to allow itself the luxury of spending years looking for a solution to its own crisis, since other alternative movements would drive it to the margins of the political scene. Unfortunately, those are topics that are being discussed more courageously and frankly today in the reformist countries of so-called real socialism than in our country. Unless the LCY comes closer to all the ideas, unless it succeeds in overcoming the strong forces of adherents of the party-based state within its ranks, it faces the threat of being historically superseded and displaced from the political scene in our country. There are no meritorious revolutionary deeds that guarantee us a perpetual monopoly on power; the LC has to confirm itself in the everyday battle to solve society's urgent problems. The big question is whether our problems can be solved at all without a broad coalition of all the patriotic forces, regardless of ideologies and world outlooks. The lack of sensitivity to keep pace on those present-day frequencies in the socialist world is the main reason why Yugoslav socialism has a low rating in the progressive world.

[DANAS] In the new crisis that has come about, it is imperative to examine the processes which have been taking place recently in Yugoslavia, above all in Serbia and Slovenia, but equally in the other republics as well, including, of course, Croatia, with its "silence." Is that "silence," as you see it, really a silence, or is this a phenomenon characterizing the real capabilities of Croatian politics and its politicians?

[Puharic] You are leading me onto ticklish terrain, and in view of my absence from domestic political life, I can only say that I have personally experienced what you call the Croatian silence. Croatia has not been taking part in the loud Yugoslav squabbles. That is a good thing. Take into account certain historical realities. Relations between the Serbs and Croats in the Yugoslav state have

always been the main barometer of that state's stability. I do not think that our problems can be solved by a Croato-Serbian agreement, but relations between these two largest nationalities have great importance. Were the relations between these two republics and these two nationalities complicated to the extent of the tension that has prevailed between Slovenia and Serbia, I am not certain that things would come untangled in such a relatively peaceful way. I do not see that silence, then, as either cowardice or inability. I think that it was a wise and responsible policy. It certainly helped to keep the Yugoslav crisis from escalating in the direction of a drastic denouement. Of course, the big question is still the limit to which such a policy can carry one. Things are different when one speaks about the Croatian contribution to seeking a way out of the present economic and social crisis. I think that here Slovenia and Serbia have gone further, even though their programmatic orientations are preceded by different political signs. It has bothered me and I have not been able to understand that stance on the part of Croatia, which is essentially provincial, so that it has been put in a situation of the Yugoslav and international public mainly asking whether Slovenia is on the Slovenian side or the Serbian side? For all the respect I have for all the other communities in our country, I think that the ambition of Croatia must be far greater, precisely in the conception and seeking a way out of the Yugoslav crisis. I consider that "silence" on the part of Croatia out of line with its real social, economic, and general cultural potential. As to what all the reasons are for that state of affairs, I would have to have much more information to make a qualified answer.

[DANAS] The elections are approaching in the League of Communists, and you have been on the list of candidates for chairman of the Croatian LC Central Committee. However, during the discussion about application of the criteria, an attempt was reported to remove you from the list even before you declared whether you accepted the nomination. What was that actually all about?

[Puharic] I must mention that no one has spoken to me about that either at the time of my public nomination, or just before the discussion, and not even to this day. Now, that is a reflection of our political culture and of our culture generally, and I do not wish to comment on it. But I would say something about those criteria. I am certain that they do not contain the grounds for invoking a formal obstacle to my nomination. That is, the criteria do not state that candidates are not to be nominated who perform professional duties in government bodies. An ambassador is not an official in a government body, but a high-level bureaucrat in the civil service; he is not elected, but is appointed. Among other things, an ambassador does not take any part at all in the political life of his country, it is more a profession than an office. We are obviously talking about an unscrupulous political game, not about concern to abide by the criteria.

I do not say this because that nomination was of particular interest to me, but because I disagree with the



method and the manner in which that was discussed. In the context of democratic dialogue, things would have developed quite differently.

[DANAS] In view of the large number of the candidates nominated in party organizations during the preliminary proceedings, do you feel that the election rules that have been adopted are democratic enough so that in coming elections people will be elected who are in keeping with the gravity of the political situation and will have the responsibility to meet the challenges of the future?

[Puharic] In connection with the present criteria, I would go back to the position already mentioned that people holding government office should not be nominated. It is difficult to understand that in a situation when we are going to hold an extraordinary congress we would exclude such a broad range of competent party personnel from the composition for party office. That really has nothing to do with the principle of separation of government office from offices in the party, since that principle can be guaranteed simply by the present practice that the candidates, if they accept a nomination to an office in the party and should they be elected, must at the same time leave their positions in the government. This present procedure impoverishes the competition and the possibility of selection, and everything taken together is detrimental to the turnover of personnel, which is more than necessary. Should we follow that logic, then in future we should not nominate those who hold office in the party to office in the government. That would create an artificial division of people into those predestined for government office and those predestined for party office. That kind of division would be harmful in several ways. I think that we should simply take over the practice from the federation and allow all party members to be equal in the nomination process. Perhaps there are certain other reasons which I do not see at this moment. I would like to make another remark about the position "that as a rule young established personnel be nominated to bodies and to offices." It seems as though an attempt is being made to replace a monopoly of the elderly with a monopoly of young people. Nevertheless, the progressive world is working out those things on the formula of a symbiosis between youth and experience: in our country, unfortunately, extremes predominate. We have a situation in the country today where cases are very rare when people between the ages of 50 and 60 hold the most important offices, and people between 60 and 70 are a real exception.

It seems to me that our practice and orientation is just as dangerous and harmful as when people talked about 40-year-olds as though they were young kids and political greenhorns. We simply should find the right measure here, stay away from exclusiveness based on age, and turn toward people's specific abilities and attributes. It could be a fatal error to consent to the luxury if in our social situation we exclude from positions of leadership people with rich experience and knowledge just in order to give preference to youth as a biological category.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that everything I have said on this occasion should not be related to my present job and the institution in which I am employed. These are exclusively my own reflections, and my responsibility for the assessments and judgments I have expressed is entirely personal.

### Croatian Press Attacks on Serbs Condemned

28000177 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Aug 89 pp 23-26

[Article by Milorad Vucelic: "Advancement of Forgeries"]

[Text] We are not attacking the Serbian people, say the spokesmen of the propaganda centers of the unscrupulous coalition, since every people is good and honest, humane and decent. We are attacking only the political leadership of that people, its history, its spiritual, moral, cultural, and political values and things it cherishes, its spoken language and its script, as well as the right to call that language by its right name, and to use its script on an equal footing, attacking its peasants, its workers, and their demands, its economic and governmental interests and its territory, its press and its public, its central scientific and cultural institutions and associations, its church and religion, its mentality, its conception of democracy both in the past and today, its achievements, its customs, its style of address and appearance, its songs, its concern for its fellow countrymen scattered abroad, the number of its casualties in history, which we reduce to a fraction.... Only that ought to be placed as a sacrifice on the altar as a pledge to an agreement and a deal, and only that has to be renounced for everything to be in order. A political and cultural leadership merely needs to be found that would do this, and everything would again be in its proper place.

Both Serbia's intelligentsia and our republic's distinguished intellectuals have, of course, been under attack more and more frequently. They have been accused as a body of silence, bribability and, nationalism. It is said that they have been "recruited" and are intoxicated with the "smell of incense," that they give preference to the ethnic over the human. In order to prove this thesis, appeals are made to former officials and pensioners who have been living off sinecures for several decades; they are appealed to as witnesses and elevated to the status of serious intellectuals of the first rank. Voltairian wit is sought among the self-taught and high school boys innocent of both accomplishments and talent. Those who are too well known for their conformism and mental laziness are taken as the paradigm of an authentic position of intellectual criticism. That position which has always been out of everything or has been against every authority only to a harmless extent, never undertaking anything concrete against any authority and thus always surviving under every authority, is proclaimed to be the authentic position of the intellectual.

### Enforced Equality

In order to discredit things Serbian, an enormous number of forgeries and false intellectual figures are produced such as Jevrem or Savo (Brkovic). Collected works are grafted onto them, and while Savo (the author of the famous "Ethnogenesophobia") is proclaimed to be a serious scholar, it is lamented "that the Muslims do not have a single synthetic work concerning ethnogenesis," and so on. While an extremely qualified mention of the weapons at Gazi-Mestan is criticized with all the whistles blaring, the views of Ibrahim Rugova concerning the "uprising" of the Albanian people are widely publicized and affirmed and above all supported. All the while, of course, elevating Rugova to the status of an intellectual giant.

At the same time, a great deal of space is given in the periodicals of the unscrupulous coalition, whether of the republic or federal stripe and appellation, to the blackest and worst dogmatists who use hackneyed ideological indictments in harangues in several installments and on repeated occasions against everything that is freedom loving, all of this supposedly in the name of a glorious past and still more glorious future. The Serbian intelligentsia is obstinately accused of having forgotten about Svetozar Markovic and Dimitrije Tucovic, and at the same time there is a big campaign promoting those who have denied outrightly everything that "insists excessively on the line of Serbian social democracy and then that of Serbian communism past and present." Those who continue to resort to ideological rhetoric in the campaign against the truth and arguments are promoted wholeheartedly.

One of the supposedly subtle ways of discrediting intellectuals in Serbia is forced leveling and insertion of an equals sign between utterly incommensurable statements and phenomena. All those whom the northwestern propaganda centers do not like are put in the same basket. All differences in beliefs and concepts, in the level of the debate and depth of conception are ignored, and above all literary value, cultural significance, and the political authority of those forcibly equated are neglected. Thus, it is possible, as is done by the periodicals of the propaganda centers from the northwest of Yugoslavia, to completely equate Vojislav Seselj, Dobrica Cosic, Vuk Draskovic, Petar "Ostroski" Milatovic, Matija Beckovic, Dr Miroljub Jeftic.... And afterward, all of this together is equated with Draza Mihailovic, Stevan Moljevic, Milan Nedic, Dragisa Vasic, and so on. In that strategy of forced equivalents, certain virtually insane nationalistic statements and gestures that have a pro-Chetnik or "pure" Chetnik connotation and significance are equated with extremely serious, sound, and historically relevant discussions and statements.

In keeping with this particular kind of violence to the truth and the facts, there is also a leveling of all the historical cases of suffering on this soil, so that Jasenovac, Lepoglava, and Kragujevac, and also Banjica and Jadovno are thus put in the same basket. Someone is

always found, of course, following in the steps of Jevrem Brkovic, Andjelko Kovacevic, or Vukasin Micunovic, to equate, in his own name or in the name of some youth forum, the Knin celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo and Stari Trg, some pro-Chetnik slogan and all the poetry of Matije Beckovic, the meeting in the Cankar Center and the counterrevolution in Kosovo, the expulsion of the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo with the voluntary carrying of some picture, Dobrica Cosic with the slogans in some local community, and so on. Of course, anyone who is willing to force such an equivalence will be given a place on the title page of a northwestern periodical and ample space for an interview in it.

### Recognition of the Enemy

Those who are vocal in rebelling against homogenization of the Serbian people and its intelligentsia, but in the name of the freedom to be different and pluralism, are readily and devotedly conducting true searches in their republics for potential traitors of their people who might support Serbia's present policy. It is thus stated in NEDELJNA DALMACIJA "that Milosevic, in this 'Croatian stage' of his global Yugoslav operation will be able to count on a portion of his fellow countrymen here, who will put the 'tribal call' ahead of living in peace with their age-old neighbors and people from the same region, but also on Croatian unitarists, who are still relevant. A portion of that scenario is in fact taking place; the reference here is to the search for 'healthy forces' a la Rahman Morina in these parts. Another example of this is the recent praise which the chairwoman of the Serbian Republic Conference of the SAWP had for her colleagues from the Croatian SAWP in connection with the report on the events in Knin, praise which the latter scattered to avoid. The search for such forces will quite certainly not cease, and a response can also be counted on."

"How are such people to be recognized," asks an author in NEDELJNA DALMACIJA dated 13 August 1989, in an article entitled "Is Croatia Whispering?" "They are those who already up to now have taken the lead in 'silence,' but now are excessively inclined to adjusting the symmetry in a situation of utterly asymmetrical nationalisms."

The only remaining question is what should be done, where those detected according to this formula are to be put, and how they are to be dealt with? Similar to this kind of treatment of Serbian policy and the Serbian people is the search for "political advocates" of the official policy of Serbia in Bosnia with which one column is also concerned.

Parallel to this "detection operation" and "branding operation," there is insistence, and we would say rightly so, on forgetting and leaving behind the Endehazi past of numerous members of the staff of the Krleža Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia and the Lexicography Institute. If it is a question of principles, that is an indispensable and necessary case of national pacification. Assuming, of

course, that it is not a question of continuing the old policy and of advocating the monstrous old ideologies in the new social conditions, in the new order, and in new editions. It has to be said that by definition this kind of pacification of relations within the nationality on the one hand and "recognition," "counting heads," and seeking dissension and civil war on the other are untenable and incompatible.

#### Jelacic's Call to Battle

The freshest and most drastic example of how far use of the intelligentsia can go is to be found in the recent "Open Letter to Intellectuals of Croatia" by Zivko Jelacic, member of the academy.

This letter, symptomatic and characteristic in many respects, a true call to battle, was published on 20 August by NEDELJNA DALMACIJA, but it was reprinted by many other newspapers, in accordance with the now time-tested mechanism and propagandistic pattern, under the headline "Let Us Respond With the Truth."

Without beating about the bush at all, Jelacic, member of the academy, demands the removal from power of Slobodan Milosevic and "his group," which is the predecessor of "inauguration of a totalitarian system."

Horried that the "nationality question in Kosovo is being resolved with tanks and oppression," that "there is no evidence of the progressive Serbian intelligentsia, which had its programmatic say in Svetozar Markovic's 'Serbia in the East,' and paid for its convictions in...the torture chambers of the Karadjordjevic dynasty, and which was heroically confirmed in Banjica and Jasenovac." Bringing onto the same plane in a manner known only to himself, Lepoglava, Kragujevac 1941, Banjica, and Jasenovac, placing King Alexander, who was murdered by the Ustashi, and his descendants "at the head of the Chetniks and Ustashi," Jelacic makes a connection of the Serbian leadership and the Serbian people with fascism and hurls an appeal to the intellectuals of Croatia: "Let us stand up straight as antifascists and demand the abdication of the Milosevic group from this country's political life!"

Jelacic says that the Croatian intelligentsia is not alone as it was in 1941 and that the entire "progressive world is with us." "The year 1989 is the year 1941 for us!"

This substitution (or identification) of years is more than symptomatic, as is the fable about the Croatian intelligentsia being alone. Jelacic does not mention in even a single word the intellectuals from Kerestinac and those who murdered them. Anything but an accident. It is significant that they should be omitted this year, 1989, along with the example of their opposition to their own fascism in 1941. Probably Jelacic is appealing today to those who were not forthcoming in 1941 to make up for it by standing on their feet in 1989, stand up against nothing more nor less than Serbian fascism and the Serbian "pogromist." Finally, if any segment of the intelligentsia was alone against fascism in the middle of

the world war, one must ask who is to blame and what kind of fault it was for that real or alleged aloneness? Who today is supposed to be heartened by the absence of that aloneness? How is it that that alleged aloneness did not in the least hinder the intelligentsia in Kerestinac or the Partizans from standing up to be counted? And, finally, what intelligentsia was it that was alone in 1941? Who left it? And what company was it keeping and whose support did it have in the middle of the world conflict?

#### Criminals and Victims

Jelacic is utterly without shame in equating the criminals and the victims and in bringing Lepoglava and Jasenovac onto the same plane in his recognizable way, thus linking the Serbian people and fascism, presumably by virtue of this being the same order of magnitude, using Jasenovac in particular. Is this renewed encounter supposed to have consequences identical to those in 1941? Can the omission of a confrontation with one's own be made up for by battling someone else's real or supposed fascism, and is a difference of some 50 years really such a negligible interval so that everything can be equated retroactively?

Jelacic will cry that "Europe will stand up with us in defense against those (the Serbs) who sing" bloodthirsty songs about slaughtering Croats. This is becoming a key "argument" linking the Serbs and fascism. That logic of linking the Serbian people to fascism can be used to link the Jews to fascism as well. Thus, Jelacic's informants, and indeed he himself, by the logic of putting the hangman in the place of the victim, might resort to some possible ditty that would certainly be punishable as a misdemeanor and that would go approximately like this: "Do not go to the sea, you German, or you will again go to the gas chambers!" We need only to mention in addition that this "ditty" has recently been very popular among the Jews and is even characteristic of their general disposition and the way they are thinking in both political and human terms.

That this "logic" whereby the Jews and Serbs can be associated with fascism and with the gas chambers at Jasenovac is no mere incident can be seen from the critical review (had it been critical, that would have been a good sign) of Franjo Tudjman's most recent book "Bespuca povjesne zbiljnosti" [Wildernesses of Historical Reality]. That is, in VJESNIK's most recent Saturday supplement it says that "Tudjman has correctly noted that during the war and immediately after it no particular finger was pointed at Jasenovac as a camp that was much more horrible than all the others put together, and the only serious departure from that was the well-known report of the Regional Commission for Establishment of War Crimes, which was used for the reparation purposes of the government of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, which contained the figure of about 500,000-600,000 people murdered."

The review says that Tudjman, when he asserts that "at the most 30,000 to 40,000" prisoners were killed at Jasenovac, nevertheless overstates it by a factor of at least "two to three" if we start with an exact count as was done, for example, by Bogoljub Kocovic and Vladimir Zerjavic in their studies. The reviewer, Zeljko Kruselj, also has this to say: "If we return now to the problem of the camp's operation, we note that it could not have been in the interest of the Jasenovac administration to engage in individual or large-scale murder on a daily basis, since in a number of production shops they had to meet various production targets to meet the needs of the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia. Economic interest, then, had to be more important than the indubitable pathological inclinations of the camp administration."

No doubt about it—a true "Marxist" analysis. And news to the effect that the Ustashi gave not even a thought to genocide of the Serbian people.

We also read in the review that thanks to "Tudjman's intransigence" several documents have been published "which show that the operation of the camp (Jasenovac—M.V.) was actually in the hands of the Jewish inmates, and that even some of them bore responsibility for the crimes against the Serbs and the others, in part even out of venality. Certain of the outrages in the camp undoubtedly support that thesis (the extensive smuggling of gold in a tie-up with the Ustasha guards, for example).... But Tudjman must not overlook that every Jewish 'kapos' was the first victim when an order of the camp administration was not carried out...."

But that is not all, since, as Kruselj says, "Tudjman you would expect not to mention [negative supplied by translator] that the Jasenovac camp was in use right up until 1947, but had new Ustasha 'patients.' Some of the skeletons found later, Tudjman says, were theirs, and here might also be the answer to the question of why the remaining camp facilities were demolished overnight."

A truly new view of Jasenovac and of the executioners and victims in it.

But the thrust of this review fits perfectly in the propagandistic paradigm of forced comparisons and equivalences for the purpose of discrediting, which has already been described. Thus, it is said, following this sinister game with the number of criminals and slaughtered, that Tudjman is actually trying thereby to "offer himself to Croatia as a candidate for 'father of the nation.' He even shares a similar political destiny with his Serbian counterpart Dobrica Cosic."

Thus, a circle known for a long time is closed once again, but by the same token they are obstinately continuing to run round and round that same evil track.

### 'Media War' Over Political, Ethnic Issues Examined

28000182 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
22 Aug 89 pp 7-9

[Article by Milan Jajcinovic and exchange between Milan Komnenic and Vuk Draskovic: "Seething Media Warfare"]

[Text] The Yugoslav media war is not winding down. The long-range artillery is thundering constantly, just as in Beirut. The last salvo arrived over the distance of the "notorious 400 km" and exploded on Television Zagreb and its commentator Tomislav Jakic. These new salvos—they arrived as a consequence of yet another "attack on Serbia"—showered new shrapnel on the newspaper field of Mars, already torn up by shells fired from beneath the Alps, Avala, Sljeme, Trebevic....

The adding of certain new colors to the "Spectrum" is only the most recent fusillade in the ongoing Yugo-media war, in which for a long time now there have not even been fragile cease-fires. Rarely are any conventions respected in that war, ethical conventions especially. Of course, not all the newspapers, nor all the radio and TV stations have become "assault battalions," nor have all journalists suffered a moral breakdown and become commandos of their nationalities or republics. Not even journalists can stay clean in the Augean stables of our politics. Those who manage to do so become suspicious; they are after all different. The dirty ones are more numerous, and they attempt by their uproar, which they would like to raise to the level of argument, to drive the others to be just like them. Since they judge the others on the basis of their own lackey's role, they cannot allow those others to "pretend to be individuals." They still look upon journalism as the extended arm of politics and the service of politics (most frequently today that politics is referred to as "ethnic"), rather than a profession. And since today the politicians are bickering, squabbling, and quarreling—parading like ethnic models—so the journalists also fight, imitating their bosses.

The alternative movements in Slovenia, the so-called solidarity rallies, Kosovo reality, the eighth meeting of the Serbian party, the so-called differentiation in Serbia, the "antibureaucratic revolution," Janez Stanovnik's speech in America, the Agrokomerc scandal, the policy of the Federal Executive Council, the celebration at Gazi Mestan, the events in Knin and on the Adriatic coast, the position of the Serbs in Croatia, Serbia's proposal concerning the constitutional amendments...are topics over which Yugoslav information speech has been and is divided. Divisions over these crucial events of the recent past occurred on the one hand because of the disintegration of the last remnants of monolithic ideology and thought and on the other hand because of the effort to preserve it, but in such a way as to reproduce one's own "picture of the world." The instilling of "new truths" was tried (unsuccessfully) in BORBA, while MLADINA, DELO, and DANAS have been uninterruptedly (which



means still) denounced as "organs" of the alleged "unscrupulous coalition." After that, the joint TV news program "fell apart," and now a ruckus is being made over "Spectrum," and Zivorad Igic, vice president of the Federation of Yugoslav Journalists, is accusing "certain newspapers in the northwestern regions of the country" for what they have written about Kosovo and Serbia, asserting that it "even goes beyond the campaign which Radio Tirana, ZERI I POPULIT, and certain other newspapers in Albania are waging against Serbia and Yugoslavia."

Many journalists today are waging nothing other than trench warfare on behalf of "their own" policies and those who embody them. Some do this out of conviction or their own political shortsightedness, others because of a possible sinecure which they would get from the politicians as a gift in return for loyalty. Regardless of whether they do this out of conviction or for some gain, they spare no one who thinks the opposite; like piranhas they attack in schools and gnaw everything down to the bone. Now, there is no need for anyone to wonder at this, since wherever there is an internalized "ethnic interest" or pressure of a personal interest, everything is mediated through them, and that is why the truth becomes the same thing as an interest. If in this the personal interest and the "ethnic interest" also coincide or are the same thing, what could be better? Incidentally, the media war was not even started for the sake of the truth, but for the sake of an interest represented as the truth. In that war, the truth can only suffer. Which is in fact what usually happens to it.

#### The Drina as a Border

During the several years he has been concerned with foreign policy, Zagreb television's foreign political commentator has never experienced what he now experiences after a single program on domestic politics. Although "Spectrum" had several segments, one was attacked first, and only later did another one come under attack. First, the segment of the program about the YPA, and then the conversation with the Serbian writers Milan Komnenic and Vuk Draskovic. In the segment about the YPA, it was said that the Army, since it belongs to all of Yugoslavia, cannot, nor does it wish to become involved in the arguments between the nationalities and republics and to intervene on behalf of one republic or nationality. Statements of "a high official" and a "popular leader" were also mentioned at that time as evidence that such opinions exist: "Unless we straighten things out, we will be sending tanks," and: "These are caterpillars that eat children." The segment was immediately described as "a laying of mines in the tracks" of the YPA, while one reader—in POLITIKA's column "Echoes and Reactions"—"recognized," he said, in the "top government leader" who knows why, "a clear allusion to Comrade Milosevic's speech in Gazi Mestan," although Milosevic did not utter that sentence. Jakic was added to the list of journalistic "negativists," who, it is felt, have for a long time now been placing a "negative sign in front of Serbia."

The newspapers from "the north" (JEDINSTVO of Pristina is already writing about politicians "from the other side of the Drina") did not share that opinion about the segment concerning the YPA. Thus, it was demonstrated once again that all the cracks in Yugoslav society are also present in the media, and indeed it is there that they are the most visible. Which is probably why VECERNJE NOVINE of Sarajevo "turned over the record" and published an article about the second segment viewed on "Spectrum," concerning the conversation between Milan Komnenic and Vuk Draskovic. VECERNJE NOVINE wrote:

"Were this country a state governed by law, after their appearance on the Swedish radio network, which was above all uncivilized, Messrs Vuk Draskovic and Milan Komnenic would have a hard time getting past the Yugoslav customs and passport inspectors." Immediately after that, an article appeared in the Belgrade newspaper VECERNJE NOVOSTI which accepted that criticism of the "dirty segment of the writers," "which no one, not even they themselves, can defend," but suspicions are also expressed to the effect that their appearance on the Zagreb program had been "craftily trumped up and staged," since this "alleged interview" "appears never to have been broadcast" (which one could figure out from the introduction of the segment).

The case of "Spectrum" is actually paradigmatic if one wishes once again to carefully spot the methods in Yugoslav journalism which are again becoming more and more customary and therefore also increasingly loud and stale. If it is doubtful, you pull at your beard, if not, you make it so—and then by constantly turning it over and over, repeating and demonstrating its "faults," you undertake to destroy the entire thing. It is a very simple logic and can be reduced to a rule expressed in one sentence: if there is a problem with a detail, the entire thing is problematical. It thus ceases to matter whether the thesis about the YPA is correct or not, for example, but all that matters is whether this or that "high official" said it. What is important is not whether there were shouts of "we want weapons" at any of the previous rallies, but whether the crowd was as large as written by the advocates of the philosophy of large numbers. In that pattern of thought, it becomes quite superfluous whether in Knin there were "people dressed bizarrely" (which is not just a fashion detail), but it becomes far more important to demonstrate that others "are lying" even about that, since they wrote that "Zora" was established under an oak, not under a nettle. Another way is to put something that is politically reluctant, if it has gone too far, through a media pressing, so that "Russians" (regardless of whether there were any or not) are turned into a "gusle."

Yet another method emerged in the hatchet job on "Spectrum." This was evading the essence and pushing public attention to what was secondary and marginal; the attempt to show that that was actually the essence. Thus, what Vuk Draskovic and Milan Komnenic said became secondary, and the manner (which in truth "was not



regulated") suddenly becomes essentially and extremely important. Were someone else insisting on that, not those who in their public activity have never—except when it fitted their strategy—respected the customs of formal law, presumably in the opinion that they are against the "will of the people," it all would have looked like bureaucratic hair-splitting. As it is, it sounds like cynicism. But this should be no wonder, since the moral integrity of a multitude of Yugo journalists has perhaps never been so problematical.

### Journalistic Machetes

In one segment of unhappy reality, Yugoslav journalism had the illusion that it could become an elixir that would revivify society and restore its ethical spirit. The feeling was that its strength, which had been exhausted during long years of wriggling under the paws of power, was beginning to return and that it could become powerful. When it had begun to convince itself (more than others were doing) that it was becoming divine, the gods came and shattered its every dream. The gods knew that the conquest of journalism, taming it and teaching it tricks, is a precondition of power. Another sacred rule in paving the highways of one's own sacrosanctity is to drive back those who are reluctant and stubborn, buy off those who are wavering, win over the fickle, and set up those who are devoted, even if they are empty-headed. The most essential thing is that they be persistent, that they stop at nothing and all think the same way. In any case, there is already someone who will "funnel ideas" into them. Their job is to use their journalistic machetes to clear the path for creation of the "petrified eternity." For the pyramids to be built, the people have to be persuaded that this is to their glory. Which is why all the "misfits," "eccentrics," and "hard heads" have to be removed from the public scene, since they could "jump off," since they are unpredictable and therefore potential destroyers of the newly produced order and harmony without which there is no pyramid.

The main problem of Yugoslav journalism—which is actually a copy of society—is not that opinions differ, but that the right to that difference is being denied. Disputation and disagreement are altogether ordinary characteristics of a democratic society. In our country, however, everything takes on different features. Usually primitive ones. As it goes in politics, so it goes in journalism. If things go on this way, being like a cat will be essential to our makeup. We will think one thing and say another, one thing "to our own" and something else to "their people." In journalism, the differences began to multiply more significantly as a consequence of Kosovo, and then their growth became still faster. It continued with the rallies, the Slovenian ferment, Knin, the events this summer on the Adriatic.... At this point, it is altogether clear to everyone that it is no longer a question of ordinary differences in opinions and views. After all, when such differences are constantly spotted, and one wishes to establish his own opinion with every propaganda weapon as the only correct one, then it is no longer

a question of the right to differ, but rather of erasing that right and trying to push the differing opinion into the abyss.

What our differences are like can be seen every day. Thus, about 10 days ago POLITIKA's column "Echoes and Reactions" published a letter from the writer Mosa Odalovic of Pristina, who wrote that the "cowardly arsonists," with a match (he used the word *zigica* instead of *sibica*!) "saved from 1941, have kindled hatred toward undefended children from the land of Serbia," and this is his message at the end of the letter: "At this moment, I find quite important northwestern addresses unreliable, and I call upon the Yugoslav Children's Festival in Sibenik to include in the program for the anniversary celebration next year a prayer for undefended children." SLOBODNA DALMACIJA reprinted the letter from POLITIKA, by contrast with POLITIKA, which does this only when the letter is responding to it, along with a note to the effect that it was reprinting it on behalf of those readers of SLOBODNA DALMACIJA who do not read POLITIKA, so they "might see how hatred is being generated and evil called upon in certain letters published in that column." At the same time, DUGA would not even hear of "Adriatic meetings" being arranged through DANAS!, and it literally wrote that "it is not honest Croatian nationalists who are to blame for those contemptible acts, but disappointed readers of DANAS"! So much for respecting the right to differ!

### Butlers at the Service of Politics

There are those who think that the existence of such great differences between Yugoslav periodicals is actually a kind of simulation of the multiparty system. If that is so, and it might be, then there exist not only "parties," but even what might be called "party coalitions." For the moment, that coalition is the most monolithic in Serbia. When something is to be kept quiet, it is kept quiet, when something is to be spoken about, it is spoken about. There has been silence about Dusan Mitevic, the isolates, and Zivorad Kovacevic. Ivan Stambolic, Dragisa Pavlovic, and Bogdan Bogdanovic have also been silent. But many are speaking who did not speak earlier. In the "northern regions" (as the Belgrade media have gotten into the habit of saying recently), there is still not that kind of harmony—although the journalistic majority in Serbia will certainly not agree with that. But that is its right to differ, which it uses superbly when that suits it and contests it when it does not suit it. Will that right be granted to the FRANCE-PRESSE correspondent who called the special edition of INTERVJU containing stories about supposed plans for sinking Serbia (in order to defend '48!) a "science-fiction scenario"?

The FRANCE-PRESSE correspondent wrote that "the revival of this and similar episodes from early postwar history has become increasingly popular in Yugoslavia recently, especially in its largest republic, Serbia, now that interethnic tensions have become more intense in the country." The correspondent believed that "awakened Serbian ethnic consciousness" is served by this and

"similar tales in that they prove the alleged systematic anti-Serb policy of the Communist Party." Everyone has the right to think what he likes about whether that is so or not, but it is a fact that for a long time now Josip Broz and Edvard Kardelj, the half-drunk Ivan Stevo Krajacic, and quite a large group of "Serbian traitors" (earlier consisting of Draza Markovic, Petar Stambolic, Dusan Dragosavac..., joined quite recently by Koca Popovic and Peko Dapcevic), and finally even the "most successful prime minister in history," Ante Markovic, are mentioned as though they have been working "against Serbia."

Differences between periodicals can no longer be interpreted in terms of "ours" and "theirs," and of "open-minded" and "close-minded" journalism. After all, if journalism is only a mirror of Yugoslav reality, then the milieu it comes from is reflected in its parts, and one might therefore speak about "close-minded" and "open-minded" politics as well. And in that politics big and therefore also shady games have been played for a long time and the future arrangement of Yugoslavia will depend on their outcome. That is in fact why the media are a reflection of politics, that is, of policies. Considerably more, certainly, in those environments where the umbilical cord between the media and politics, at one point severed, has been connected once again. And in such situations journalism has always behaved like the butler to politics, and if necessary even the gardener and the most devoted lackey and the best lacquerer. There are, of course, those among them who do not otherwise put up with servitude, but they like the "resoluteness and intelligence" of their political bosses, who are using the media to persuade people that they are fighting for "something new and great." These are intellectual secretaries, by contrast with the multitude of the journalistic intellectual lumpenproletariat. Some day, such people end up in politics themselves. But among the journalists there are also many who are trying to do their job professionally, which usually also means honorably, who do not trade their beliefs "like Gypsies trade horses," nor do they wait for coded messages from politicians and then ask: "Who, who?" Nevertheless, they appear to be (have been) too few. That is why the crude wooden plow of political journalism thrust them to the edge, constantly threatening to push them over that edge into the abyss and thus clear the way once and for all for a policy which does not tolerate difference unless that difference is of service to it.

#### [Exchange between Komnienic and Draskovic]

##### What They Said

Milan Komnienic: Kosovo is Serbia, and that is the way it has to be. If 20 some have fallen, tomorrow 20 times as many and 400 times as many must fall. We have to defend every foot of our territory, every foot of our spirituality. Decane, Gracanica, Pec, and the Ljeviska Madonna. This is the cherished center of our spirituality and our entire identity.

Vuk Draskovic: We cannot explain the truth about Kosovo until we can state certain key facts. We have been prevented from telling the real truth, those key facts, by the party concilium, which secretly, out of piety and I do not know what else toward the undying leader of the Yugoslav revolution has said and found that he is alive even today. And the real truth is that after the war the government of Josip Broz Tito gradually, but openly and systematically, formed yet another Albanian state on the historical territory of the Serbian nationality, so that we came to have two Albanias in the Balkans: one belonging to Enver Hoxha and the Albania of Josip Broz.

Milan Komnienic: I think that the solution is just over the horizon, and we are even living in the days of a sudden and rapid resolution of an absurdity. After all, while you are living an absurdity, it seems to you that it cannot be untangled and resolved, but when that absurd bastion begins to be torn down, then you ask why over a period of so many years we did not tear it down, since it was based on utterly false and erroneous premises? Our premises were altogether mistaken. When I say "our," I am thinking of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has been a premise ever since 1918.... Serbia is supposed to be the perpetual pillar and support for all Yugoslavia: we will all undermine Yugoslavia, but Serbia must defend it and do so in the name of the supposed sin of the big state and expansionist Serbian hegemony. However, the Comintern's, Broz's, and the party's, once we have realized that Serbia's only future is to behave like all the normal peoples in Europe: with cultural, economic, and ethnic awareness, I am convinced that with all its natural, spiritual, and cultural and economic potential, it will by the same token be resolving the question of Kosovo and its own general issue. The other members of our Federation will quickly figure out what they should do, if they have not already. And I assure you that the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia enjoys rights such as are not enjoyed by a single minority anywhere in the world. And the defamed Aleksandar Rankovic, whom they take as a synonym of Serbian executioners, it was under him that the Albanians got their university and their written language and their representatives in the seats of power: the party and the government, and so on, and so forth.

Vuk Draskovic: Does that Sweden know, and how much do those who report to it the truth about Kosovo and relate the state of the facts, does it know that the Comintern, a bit earlier I spoke about Josip Broz, that after the war Communists who were representatives of nationalities defeated in World War I had the principal influence and role and leadership in the Comintern after the war in the Communist Internationale in Moscow? They were Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Croats. Josip Broz belonged to a nationality, the Croatian nationality, defeated in World War I. He was a Communist and followed the tasks and outlines of the Comintern with absolute consistency. I must say that many Serbian Communists in the Comintern before the war refused to plot against the Serbian people and that

they were all executed to the last man in Stalin's concentration camps, and those who during the period 1941-45, during the war, in the Partizans, were discovered to have ambitions not to follow that plot against the Serbian nationality were also eliminated in some mysterious way. The obedient ones remained, those remaining were the Stambolices, the Draza Markovices, the Gojko Tintors, the Peko Dapcevinces...all of them, then, degenerates and traitors to the last man. They have committed one of the greatest acts of treason in the history of the Serbian people.

Milan Komnenic: Just as a needle was driven into the heart of Russian ethnic identity in 1917, so after the war a needle was driven into our identity, and we still have not proclaimed the guilt of all those responsible for it being that way. I ask you kindly, what does Yugoslav diplomacy specifically say about all this in the countries where it is active? It speaks neither objectively nor with a desire to reveal things. It speaks unobjectively and with a desire to conceal things. I state that to you as a fact. I am not speaking about Sweden, since I do not know, but I am telling you about the other European countries where our diplomats have already been exposed to official criticism for concealing the state of affairs in Kosovo and for spreading anti-Serb attitudes in the media there. The effect of the writers is negligible compared to the press, television, and radio and compared to the diplomatic influence which every state has to have. So, our official policy must have a clear position on this. But unfortunately it does not. Until recently, it was anti-Serb through party forums and through all TV and through the public in the country. Why would the situation be any different outside?

Vuk Draskovic: That goes without saying....

### **Alleged Slovenian Call for Confederation Criticized**

28000174 *Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian*  
20 Aug 89 pp 17-18

[Article by Miodrag Jovicic: "How Slovenia Is Attempting To Finally Turn Yugoslavia Into a Confederation"]

[Text] In the constitutional debates conducted over the last year or two, Slovenia has gone much further than the other republics, and sometimes has been the only one, in taking positions which have aroused the attention of the public and have been the subject of disagreement with other participants in those debates. I am thinking above all of regulation of the federation and of relations in it. It is well-known that in our unfortunately conceived "consensual federation" Slovenia by virtue of the positions it took last year has prevented implementation of at least those most necessary changes of the federal Constitution that would have halted the processes of further disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Now, Slovenia has come forth with a proposal containing amendments to the republic Constitution which

was published in translation (a poor one) in BORBA on 7 August of this year. This offered the entire Yugoslav public an occasion to familiarize itself with Slovenian views of the arrangement of their own republic and indirectly of the federation.

My essay will focus on the position of SR Slovenia in the Yugoslav Federation according to this package of proposed amendments, but first it would be good to note that the amendments in the areas of the socioeconomic system and the political system call for certain innovations which can only be welcomed, especially from the viewpoint of a more realistic approach to self-management, recovery of the economy, and democratization of the system.

First of all, the package of proposed amendments includes numerous provisions which have to do with the status of property, organization of the economy, and self-management. In all these areas, the amendments go further than last year's amendments of the federal Constitution and prefigure a more rational constitutional regulation of these matters. For example, equality of the forms of ownership is proclaimed, opportunities are opened up for private enterprise, elements of a market economy are introduced, while at the same time "conclusion of self-management accords and social compacts" is abandoned, self-management in enterprises is made more flexible, and so on.

### **Favorable Changes**

The amendments to the Slovenian Constitution envisage considerable changes in the political system, much greater than in the amended federal Constitution. Thus, socialist self-management democracy is no longer described as a "specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat," the League of Communists is not referred to as the "leading ideological and political force," the right to free political association and establishment of political organizations is guaranteed, equality of citizens is guaranteed regardless of political or other conviction, direct and secret elections are being instituted, all judges in regular courts are to be elected by the republic assembly, the Council of the Republic is abolished, and so on.

As is evident, in the sphere of the socioeconomic system and political system the proposed changes are undoubtedly favorable. Many of them coincide with the proposals contained in the Basic Positions on Reform of the Political System prepared by the Commission of the Presidency of SR Serbia for the Social Reform. Roughly speaking, the similarity is greater in the area of the socioeconomic system and not so great in the domain of the political system in view of the impact which the federal system has, especially on the way power is organized—and here there are obvious differences in the views of Serbia and Slovenia. This similarity in the thinking of the two republics, which in some places is even identical, could be valuable when it comes to designing the future constitutional system of Yugoslavia.



It is to be hoped that the other republics will also agree to the need for fundamental changes in the socioeconomic system and political system by and large in the direction of the views of Serbia and Slovenia.

However, the basic problem in the reorganization of Yugoslavia and in its transformation into an up-to-date, strong, and democratic federation, which is a *conditio sine qua non* of its survival as a unified governmental community, will be the widely differing views concerning organization of the federation and concerning regulation of relations within it. The Slovenian view of this issue does not conform at all with the concept of a federation; it is markedly confederalist. If up to now there was any room for doubt in this respect, now that the package of proposed amendments has been made public, it is obvious that Slovenia conceives Yugoslavia as a confederation. There are abundant elements to support that conclusion, and I will briefly indicate here only some of them.

The amendments do not explicitly proclaim SR Slovenia to be a sovereign state, but nevertheless all the consequences are drawn indirectly from that conception of statehood as elements of political and economic sovereignty are incorporated.

#### The Right To Secede

This is indicated, first of all, by proclamation of the right to secede. The federal Constitution, as is well known, states in the Basic Principles that the Yugoslav nationalities, "premised upon the right of every nationality to self-determination, including the right to secede...have united" to form Yugoslavia. The federal Constitution, then, speaks in the past tense about exercise of the right to self-determination and secession: The Yugoslav nationality exercised that right, which they undoubtedly possessed, and thus by their free will jointly formed the Yugoslav Federation. The drafters of the federal Constitution, although they went as far as they could in disassembling Yugoslavia as a governmental community, nevertheless showed good sense enough not to proclaim the right to self-determination and above all not the right to secede, knowing that its right did not come into consideration under any conditions—except under the conditions of an unconstitutional breakup of Yugoslavia. This position on the part of the authors of the federal Constitution is in keeping with the logic on which any constitutional system is based and which does not allow the legal possibility of infringing on the integrity of the state.

The sole exception, as is well known, is the USSR Constitution, which proclaims the right of the union republics to "freely withdraw from the USSR." This provision, incorporated as an expression of Leninist conceptions concerning the right to self-determination "all the way to secession and the formation of an independent state," conceptions devised in the period of national revolutionary ferment in Russia, figured in all the Soviet constitutions, where it had the role of a

decorative prop of the system. (Probably at this point, if the question of exercising the constitutional right to secede from the USSR [original reads "SFRY"] is seriously raised in the Baltic republics, the drafters of the Soviet Constitution will realize the extent of the thoughtlessness shown in proclaiming that right.)

So, what is not envisaged by the SFRY [original reads "USSR"] Constitution—the right of a people to self-determination and the right to secede—is now being proclaimed, regardless of that, by the drafters of the Slovenian Constitution, and this is done in the normative section of the Constitution, in the very first article. Paragraph 2 of Article 1 would read as follows according to the package of proposed amendments: "SR Slovenia is a component of the SFRY on the basis of the complete and inalienable right of the Slovenian people to self-determination, which also includes the right to secede and form associations." In the Basic Principles, the Slovenian Constitution contains a formulation similar to the one in the federal Constitution, to the effect that the Slovenian people has exercised its right to self-determination. Thus, should this amendment be adopted, an obvious difference would arise between the views expressed in the Basic Principles and in the normative section of the Constitution.

It explicitly follows that the drafters of the Slovenian Constitution are not thinking about the right to secession as of some *nudum jus* from the extremely long and extremely confused substantiation provided for that amendment, whereby "should any nationality find itself in a position that it cannot bring about the elementary conditions for its life within that (the Yugoslav—M.J.) community, it lies within the sovereign rights of every people to exercise the right to self-determination, including the right to secede."

As we have seen, the amendment also envisages the "right to enter into association" (and the substantiation also mentions "attachment" as an element of the right to self-determination). The authors of the Slovenian Constitution were too realistic to envisage the possibility that Slovenia would form an independent state, which is certainly one option in exercising the right to self-determination. But on the other hand they gave abundant warning of the possibility, following secession, of association with someone else, of attachment to someone else. Under Slovenia's specific conditions, one can put the question of who Slovenia would associate with? With Austria, perhaps, or with Italy, or possibly with some third European or non-European country in which Slovenia would be a slave?

One inevitably asks whether in this kind of constitutional provision, with its childish insistence on the right to secession, the authors of the Slovenian Constitution have not committed a grave sin against their own people, whether they have not placed on it a historical stamp of shame? Can it be that the Slovenian people, which for the first time after more than 1,000 years of enslavement to a foreigner, acquired the right to self-organization in

Yugoslavia, to use of its own language, to instruction in that language, to expression of its own culture, to equal participation in organizing the federation and performance of its functions, which for 70 years has enjoyed a position that is in many ways privileged in the common state—can it be that that people, alone of all the Yugoslav nationalities, among which some are larger and some are more culturally and politically advanced, with a considerably older statehood and democratic traditions, can be the only one to make the demand, with no basis in theory and unfeasible as a practical matter, to enjoy the right to secession?

The federal Constitution does not afford it that right, so that should this amendment be adopted, there would obviously be a contradiction between the Constitution of SR Slovenia and the SFRY Constitution. However, since the federal Constitution does not envisage legal means by which to eliminate the contradiction between republic constitutions and the federal Constitution, this provision of the Constitution of SR Slovenia would remain in force and would figure as constitutional grounds for making the demand for secession. This casts a full light on the threat (or perhaps blackmail?) contained in the substantiation, according to which "the purpose of including the right to self-determination in the normative section of the Constitution of SR Slovenia is to give fundamental emphasis to the position of SR Slovenia..., under what conditions Slovenes are willing to live in Yugoslavia, and on what assumptions we are willing to build a life together." Should it decide for secession, "association" or "attachment," Slovenia would have an alibi in its own Constitution. And it is this constitutional provision that contains the danger to Yugoslavia's integrity.

#### **'Economic Sovereignty'**

Aside from the right to secession, the package of proposed amendments also contains another markedly confederal element—the provision for Slovenia's economic sovereignty. Under Amendment X, "working people and citizens in SR Slovenia freely decide on their work and the results of their work and freely dispose of natural resources and sources of natural resources in keeping with their rights and duties as defined in the Constitution." This realizes the theoretical position concerning the right of every nationality to dispose of the results of its labor, on which Slovenia, behaving like an independent state, has been constantly insisting. A federation, however, is a form of government in which its every part, as it enters into the community, must inevitably give up a portion of its independence, including its economic independence. This is the case even with multinational federations—otherwise life together would be impossible.

In a confederation, by contrast, every confederated state, retaining full sovereignty, also possesses the capability to organize its own economy, as well as the "use of the results of labor" realized in that state in the manner which it wishes. Slovenia, just like all the other republics,

cannot possess such a right, since that would signify a further parcelization of Yugoslav economic space and would frustrate the organization of any kind of unified market. That is why this constitutional provision, behind which stand very clearly expressed special Slovenian interests, cannot stand—unless, once again, there is a willingness to have a republic constitution that is contrary to the federal Constitution.

#### **Jus Nullificationis**

The constitutional amendments envisage for SR Slovenia a right that is not possessed by a single federal unit in the world. This is the right established in Amendment XLVIIIa, according to which, "when decisions of federal bodies and agencies violate or threaten the rights of SR Slovenia, its bodies and agencies must take steps to guarantee protection of the position and right of SR Slovenia as defined in the Constitution." In other words, SR Slovenia, although it is a member of the federation, may refuse to apply the decisions of federal bodies and agencies and may undertake "appropriate steps." In the final analysis, just like some member of a confederation, it would possess *jus nullificationis*, the right not to apply the decisions of the federation on its territory.

Similarly, again just as in some confederation, only the Assembly of SR Slovenia would possess the right on the basis of Constitutional Amendment XLVIIIb to proclaim a state of emergency in SR Slovenia and to define special powers. Aside from that, similarly to that amendment, "the use of armed forces in peacetime to prevent or dispatch (sic!) a state of emergency may not be ordered without consent of the Assembly of SR Slovenia." Which means that federal bodies and agencies would not have the right to proclaim a state of emergency in SR Slovenia, nor would the federal armed forces have the right to intervene on the territory of that republic "without consent of the Assembly of SR Slovenia." Unless that consent is obtained, the federation would have to observe all the events in SR Slovenia with its arms folded, even events, for instance, that might threaten the security and integrity of the entire country, with no right to interfere in the "internal affairs" of that republic. These arrangements are in evident contradiction with the spirit of the federation as a unified (although complicated) state.

As a means of blackmailing the federation in performance of its functions that require the financial participation of the republics "within the scope of constitutionally defined tasks of federal bodies and agencies and to perform tasks to meet other joint needs of the federation in keeping with joint development policy as defined by the Social Plan of Yugoslavia," Amendment LI envisages that the Assembly of SR Slovenia will in assuming its obligations "respect the financial capabilities of the republic and the needs for its development." So, the federation's ability to perform its functions would depend on the position taken by the Assembly of Slovenia. That has placed the sacred egoism of a republic on the pedestal of a constitutional provision.



And finally, let me mention an incredible provision that is contained in Constitutional Amendment XLI, according to which "federal bodies and agencies on the territory of SR Slovenia shall in their dealings with members of other nationalities and ethnic minorities respect the constitutional right of equality of the languages of the nationalities and ethnic minorities. Actions and acts which contradict those decisions do not have legal validity." Were this amendment adopted, one republic would in its constitution define the behavior of federal bodies and agencies, and if they did not respect that order, their actions and acts would not have legal validity! Once again, just as in some confederation, we would be dealing with a *jus nullificationis*, the right to nullify the decisions of the joint federal bodies and agencies.

#### The Country's Obvious Confederalization

We might go on enumerating provisions like this, purely confederal in their spirit, from the package of proposed amendments to the Constitution of SR Slovenia. As I said at the outset, it is all entirely clear at this point. Slovenia, which in what it says still advocates that Yugoslavia be a federation, is inclined toward its complete confederalization. If these constitutional amendments were adopted, that would be a significant step toward the further disintegration of Yugoslavia. It would finally cease to be a federal state and would actually become an "asymmetrical federation"(!), in which that asymmetricality would stand as new evidence that Yugoslavia—in the face of everything known in theory, comparative experience, and, in the end, common sense—is still ready to surprise the entire world with the experiments it is willing to undertake to its own detriment.

The entire text of the package of proposed amendments to the Constitution of SR Slovenia bristles with provisions that contradict the SFRY Constitution. If such provisions were adopted, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia would have to spend years establishing cases where the Slovenian Constitution does not square with the federal Constitution. Under the provisions of the present Constitution, however, that would be in vain because the hierarchical relation between the federal and republic constitutions that prevails throughout the world has not been established, requiring that if republic constitutions do not square with the federal constitution, they must be brought into conformity. The aspects examined in this essay are in themselves the best appeal for establishing in Yugoslavia's future Constitution the obligation of bringing republic constitutions into conformity with the federal Constitution, along with an effective mechanism for removing nonconformity. Otherwise, there will still be a danger of an attempt to break up Yugoslavia such as Slovenia is now undertaking.

#### Legal Basis of Vllasi Trial Discussed

28000175 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Aug 89 p 4

[Interview with Bajram Kelmendi, defense counsel of Aziz Abrashi and Burhan Kavaja, by Mladen Miroslavljec and Murteza Daci: "Trial Before a 'Restricted Public'"; date and place not given; first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] Although the indictment of Azem Vllasi, Aziz Abrashi, and Burhan Kavaja and the other 13 defendants for initiating and organizing recent counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo last November and this February has not yet been filed, public statements have already been made by Ismet Erma, presiding judge of the District Court in Titova Mitrovica, to the effect that investigatory proceedings have been completed and that the accused will receive the indictment in good time. We spoke on this occasion to Bajram Kelmendi, defense counsel for Abrashi and Kavaja and one of the best-known attorneys in Kosovo.

[VJESNIK] Are the indictments ready?

[Kelmendi] Very soon, on 2 September to be precise, it will be 6 months since criminal proceedings were instituted in Titova Mitrovica against Vllasi, Abrashi, Kavaja, and certain others. The investigation has for all practical purposes been completed, but it is actually not completed until the decision is presented to the court and also to the defense counsel, which is expected no later than 2 September, although I think this will be done toward the end of this month. It is typical of these cases that the entire proceedings are conducted by the State Security Service, although the attorneys have always been present during all the proceedings up to now. We objected to the State Security Service conducting the proceedings, and we also appealed from that decision. Under the law, certain investigatory actions may be turned over to it, but still only the court and the investigating judge can interrogate witnesses most competently. Why is the court not doing this if it is competent to do so?

#### Witnesses Interrogated Twice

[VJESNIK] Is there some detailed rationale for that?

[Kelmendi] The only justification given was that the investigation is complicated, that the subject matter is political in nature, and that the investigatory actions will be best carried out by State Security authorities. The judge, it is true, must under law enumerate in the decision all the actions turned over to the State Security Service. In this case, the public prosecutor, when he filed the motion for interrogation of witnesses to be entrusted to State Security, did so for 35 witnesses, for all the accused, and the witnesses were interrogated. However, law enforcement agencies continued to interrogate all the witnesses not covered by the decision of the investigating judge. Thus, in all, there were more than 100 witnesses.

We learned about them only when they appeared at the hearing. When their number increased by quite a bit, the lawyers defending the accused filed an objection to the work of the investigating judge, the public prosecutor, and the State Security authorities with the presiding judge of the district court, the provincial public prosecutor, and the Kosovo Supreme Court, since those witnesses had not been proposed either by the public prosecutor, nor the investigating judge, nor the defense attorneys. The law is clear that testimony taken in that way from witnesses is not acceptable as evidence in the trial. Finally, in April they began to question the witnesses once again, which is not permitted under the law.

[VJESNIK] There was also a change in the presiding judge in the District Court in Mitrovica....

[Kelmendi] I do not know exactly why that was done. I only know that Ismet Erma, who was previously presiding judge in the district court and who was then chosen to be a justice on the Kosovo Supreme Court, came to be presiding judge of the District Court in Titova Mitrovica when the investigation was already close to completion. It certainly is suggestive that Erma should have come from the supreme court to be presiding judge of the district court where he had previously been, while the heretofore presiding judge of the district court went to the Kosovo Supreme Court. A judge may be delegated, which is all well and good; however, both of these judges had their terms, and if this casting had been envisaged earlier, certainly the person who until recently was presiding judge of the District Court in Mitrovica would not have been reappointed to that position a few months ago. In my opinion, the most likely thing is that the trial will be entrusted to the new presiding judge. I had occasion to meet Ismet Erma previously in a trial in which I defended someone accused under Article 114. The evidence against him was that he had taped a program of Radio Tirana. But he was a political scientist and worked for the Committee for Foreign Relations. Erma was at that time delegated from Mitrovica to Pristina for that trial. He came with his own stenographer, he conducted the trial, and he sentenced the defendant to 9 years. I appealed, and the verdict was set aside, both that of the district court and of the Kosovo Supreme Court, and in the new trial the charge was hostile propaganda under Article 113. The defendant was given 3.5 years, and that is what he served.

### The Public in the Courtroom

[VJESNIK] What do you think about Article 113 as it relates to Kosovo?

[Kelmendi] The penalties under that article are very severe here, although there have been very few of them. By and large, the charges are under Article 114.

[VJESNIK] What is the situation now as compared to 1981 when it comes to charges for political crimes?

[Kelmendi] In 1981, there were no acquittals for those crimes in Kosovo. There were modifications, especially

affecting the penalties. The sentences originally pronounced were reduced, but again not much. For instance, a man was indicted for one case of breaking a car window and shouting the slogan "Kosovo a Republic"; this was in 1981 and was the first indictment in Kosovo for counterrevolutionary threat to the country, and he was given a sentence of 9 years. This was then contested and the charge was changed to hostile propaganda, and then the Kosovo Supreme Court modified the verdict and pronounced a sentence of 2 years. This year, we still do not have experience as to what the penal policy will be for those crimes.

[VJESNIK] What is the attitude of the public in Kosovo toward the trials for political crimes?

[Kelmendi] Back in 1981, only we lawyers really knew about it. Now, this has begun to reach public awareness, and there are various anomalies. Closer public scrutiny makes it considerably easier for us lawyers to do our job, so that I feel that there should be a greater public presence in the courtroom.

[VJESNIK] What is your comment on the report that a room seating 80 is being adapted in Titova Mitrovica for the trial of A. Vllasi and the other 16 defendants?

[Kelmendi] If more space is furnished, especially for newsmen, when you take into account the number of defendants, their defense attorneys, the judge, the prosecutor, court employees, and family members, then the trial will be attended by a restricted public. To tell the truth, I did not think there would be a trial, but I expected that if it occurred it would be held in some other place. After all, when in the affair of a drug smuggler, which is an ordinary crime, the trial was held in the auditorium of the "Boro and Ramiz" Center in Pristina and given maximum publicity, it is logical to expect that the same conditions would be provided for this trial. No room should be left for excuses about objective circumstances and restricted possibilities.

[VJESNIK] Do you believe in the disinterestedness of the courts in Kosovo?

[Kelmendi] The court is supposed to be independent and above everything, including day-to-day politics, everywhere, and that would include Kosovo. However, in our country the judges are elected officials with a definite term of office, so that I am afraid that this has an effect on their independence. Sometimes both the original verdicts and rulings on appeal show in certain cases how far that independence goes.

[VJESNIK] What is the psychophysical condition of the defendants you are defending?

[Kelmendi] Abrashi has been in a serious condition for a long time. He has been utterly unable to reconcile himself to this situation in his belief that this would not stand in the case of an innocent man. Nor is the situation any better with some of the others. Some of them are convinced that nothing will help them and that the

decision has been made to destroy them, and some are in a bad psychophysical state and are taking medication

[VJESNIK] What are the financial and professional benefits to be gained for an attorney specializing in political crimes in Kosovo?

[Kelmendi] To tell the truth, in 1981 most of those accused did not take defense counsel at all. They did not want to do so. They asserted their innocence. Even where defense counsel was automatically appointed, they said they did not agree with their counsel and did not accept what he said in their defense. Then, the belief spread that defense counsel could provide no help at all with political crimes in Kosovo, so why should the families ruin themselves financially? There is more to be gained from defending in murder cases.

#### Elastic Article 114

[VJESNIK] When did you become involved with political cases?

[Kelmendi] Criminal cases are my specialty, mostly serious crimes, and that represents 99 percent of my practice. But I have been a lawyer for 17 years. I became involved with those cases after 1981, and I must admit that defendants in those cases are the most difficult to defend. If for no other reason because close attention is paid to the kind of defense their counsel gives them. And then here in Kosovo these proceedings are unfailingly conducted by the State Security Service, never by the investigating judge, not even for ordinary propaganda. Which is why quite often a witness will testify one thing when questioned by State Security and something else when questioned by the investigating judge or when he testifies in the trial, and he says that his testimony was given under pressure. All of that also has a bearing on the work of the lawyer.

[VJESNIK] Is it true that you refused to defend A. Vllasi?

[Kelmendi] That is not true. When Vllasi was taken into custody, his wife sought me out and gave me power of attorney. Vllasi was questioned in my presence, and the questioning lasted 8 hours. However, after other attorneys were hired for him, since I was the sole defense counsel for Abrashi and Kavaja, and I knew it would be a financial burden on the family to have so many defense attorneys for Vllasi, since it was not hard to figure out that the proceedings would be lengthy, I reached agreement with his wife that I would withdraw. Anyway, I am defending the second and third defendants, so that it all constitutes a single whole. There is nothing more to it than that.

[VJESNIK] How many defendants are you now defending under Article 114?

[Kelmendi] I have nine cases, although some of my colleagues have more. There are immense differences among them because all kinds of things have been crammed into that article. Even cases which might have been taken as propaganda. Or cases which fall under Article 113 or the verbal crime.

[VJESNIK] Does that mean that some of the charges are rather for a political-ideological or disciplinary measure rather than for Article 114?

[Kelmendi] Quite right. I think that there are even misdemeanors that have been charged under this article. However, it should be borne in mind that Article 114 itself carries a penalty of not less than 1 and not more than 15 years, but if it is related to Article 139, as is the case with the defendants in Titova Mitrovica, then it carries a penalty of not less than 10 years all the way up to the death penalty. Also, in the case of crimes under Title 15 of the Criminal Code, otherwise referred to as the political crimes, I do not recall anyone here in Kosovo being released on bail while he defended himself. Not just after completion of the investigation, nor even after pronouncement of sentence, nor even when someone was sentenced to 1 year and had already spent 6 months in custody.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

## Statistics Provided on Vehicular Accidents

23000220 East Berlin DDR-VERKEHR in German  
No 8, Aug 89 (signed to press 12 Jun 89) pp 233-235

[Article by Maj Gen Heribert Mally, minister of Internal Affairs: "Some Questions on Promoting Traffic Safety in the GDR"]

[Text] One of the primary special responsibilities in ensuring maximum discipline, safety, and flow in the GDR's traffic is protecting the life and health of the citizen from the dangers of traffic and contributing as much as possible to the prevention of economic losses caused by traffic accidents. This concern is both the point of departure and the objective of traffic safety policy in the GDR.

The total number of registered vehicles has continued to increase. In the last 5 years the figure has increased by 15.4 percent. Passenger cars account for the major share, with an increase of 23.3 percent. The total number of registered vehicles on the road is now 5.62 million, of which 3.6 million are passenger cars.

One way of approaching the problem is to assume that with the rising material and cultural level of the population, the number of vehicles, primarily passenger cars, will continue to increase. In conjunction with the growing use of passenger cars to satisfy individual transportation needs, traffic density will become heavier in the next few years, compared with the current situation. International traffic, tourism, and transit traffic has also risen and will continue to do so in the coming years.

One can expect traffic to be concentrated particularly in the cities, vacation areas and in high density industrial areas. A general increase in the traffic level can be anticipated, in addition to the further accentuation of the currently existing local and rush hour peak traffic loads. This foreseeable development will make heavy demands on all state organs responsible for ensuring traffic discipline, safety, and flow. But a greater share of the responsibility will be transferred to the individual road user—whether driver or pedestrian—for his or her personal behavior in traffic, no matter what their views. There is absolutely no doubt that along with requirements for knowledge and skill, the mental and physical demands on each person will continue to increase as traffic density grows.

The program that has been in force since 1986 to improve traffic discipline, safety, and flow in the GDR has responded on a broad spectrum to this development. The tasks which must be performed through state organs to improve traffic safety were established in the program and in the resolution to implement it passed by the Council of Ministers in December 1986. The GDR's traffic safety program also takes into consideration the citizenry's—in all areas of society—level of willingness to participate voluntarily in the work of traffic safety and

it focuses on the crucial areas that have to be considered. The program is based on many years of proven experience and continues to apply this experience as appropriate to the developing situation with regard to traffic and traffic accidents. The GDR's traffic safety program has set down the following ideas as the core of its long-term strategic orientation in traffic safety work:

- The nucleus of all traffic safety measures has been, is, and will continue to be the training, education, and information of road users.
- Ensuring traffic discipline, safety, and flow requires diverse, broadly effective, and differentiated publicity work.
- The practical and effective organization of traffic contributes substantially to handling the increasing volume of traffic safely and smoothly.
- Vehicles in roadworthy and safe operating condition are an extremely important part of accident prevention.
- In the interest of and for the benefit of all citizens, socialist law must be applied consistently in traffic.
- Any additional increase in traffic discipline, safety and flow requires a reinforced application and conversion of scientific findings to the overall work of traffic safety.
- Effective work in traffic safety can only be carried out if state management of a comprehensive program of accident prevention is further refined and if society cooperates on a broad basis.

In 1987 the number of traffic accidents fell by 502 (down 1.1 percent), the number of traffic deaths dropped by 109 (down 7.3 percent) and the number of those injured dropped by 1,584 (down 4 percent). This continued the decline which started in 1978. The number of traffic deaths was the lowest since 1955, and that for persons injured the lowest since 1956. As a ratio per 100,000 inhabitants, there were 285 accidents, 8 persons suffered fatal injuries. This index also fell in comparison with the preceding period from 1984 to 1986. The decline in the severity of the consequences of accidents can be attributed principally to the introduction of compulsory seat-belt use and the wearing of helmets by motorcycle riders, to which both drivers and riders have responded in a very responsible fashion. According to the latest statistics, seat belts are being worn by 98 percent of drivers, the use of helmets among motorcyclists is 99 percent and among light motorcycle riders it is 97 percent.

Almost one-half of all traffic accidents occurred at serious danger spots—intersections/junctions and curves. While the absolute concentration of accidents at intersections and junctions, a total of about 90 percent, took place in built-up areas, one-half of the accidents in curves occurred inside and one-half outside built-up areas. More



than one-half of the accidents at intersections and junctions were the fault of passenger car drivers. Intersections where traffic is controlled by traffic signals constituted the majority.

The ranking of the principal causes of accidents "speed not appropriate for conditions," "failure to observe right of way," and "pedestrians illegally entering into/crossing the street" has not changed. These three causes are responsible for 56 percent of all accidents.

There have been no changes with respect to the ranking of those responsible for accidents. Almost one half of all traffic accidents were the fault of passenger car drivers. Pedestrians make up the second highest percentage. Among those injured, the statistics were headed by passengers in private cars, who were involved in 27 percent of the accidents, and light motorcycle operators, involved in 23.1 percent of all accidents.

Many years of experience in accident prevention work confirm that a positive influence can be exerted on the growing number of traffic accidents. This requires that the multiple efforts on the part of the state and society are directed toward encouraging all road users to drive in accordance with traffic conditions, to be attentive, considerate, and to be disciplined in traffic. In addition, objective conditions which stress safety must be created, mainly in traffic amenities. This continues to be the primary objective of the multiple activities of traffic training, education, and information, which seeks to address individual groups of road users in a specific way whenever possible. Publicity work in traffic education plays a major role. Experience from the extensive work of the published organs in this field shows that the greater the success in making the publicity work interesting, relevant, and appropriate to each road user, the better the objective can be attained.

The different effects of the individual media in publicity work must be utilized in a meaningful way.

Along with the continuing elaboration of content in traffic training and education, which has to be a closed process from childhood into old age, informing road users about the inherent dangers of traffic, the laws of physics which they must observe, physical and mental demands and personal limits in dealing with specific traffic situations and safety problems with visual perception etc., is gaining constantly in importance as traffic becomes heavier.

Directly associated with that is up-to-date information for road users about the immediate situation on the highway, that is to say, local and short-term traffic slowdowns resulting from a traffic jam or an accident, diversions or traffic control measures, as well as particular road conditions caused by weather. This type of information is only of interest to the driver, if it is truly up-to-the-minute and is pertinent to the road network he is using. This requires a well developed and organized system to gather and broadcast information. Experience with up-to-the-minute information on the radio,

meaning the "GDR Radio Traffic Service," shows that drivers listen to these items of information with great interest. In order to increase their effectiveness, efforts are being made to increase their frequency and to achieve more up-to-the-minute reporting.

The current standard in treating the problem of traffic training, education and information is already high. But day-in and day-out work demonstrates repeatedly in practice that there cannot and must not be just one rigid schema with respect to the forms and methods applied as well to the contentual and didactic form. One essential aspect is the continued scientific winnowing of the content and objectives of training and education. The development of receiver-friendly methods of presentation is an essential component in traffic safety research in the GDR.

We are not underestimating the possible ways of bringing, that is to say, transmitting the training and educational content to road users. Besides the extensive use of and the cooperation of the mass media in the most diverse genres, road user training sessions in businesses and for the public have shown themselves to be particularly effective.

Currently there exist more than 31,000 permanent road user training groups, which conducted about 340,000 training sessions in 1987 on centrally determined topics, using standardized references on content and didactic methods. More than 11 million citizens participated voluntarily in these training sessions. In this context the unflagging activity of the more than 30,000 honorary lecturers must be stressed. In their spare time they dedicate themselves with great personal involvement to improving traffic discipline and safety. In spite of these impressive numbers, the constant goal is to search for new ways to reach as many road users as possible through the system of training, education and information. This will require initiative and new ideas. Substantial resources are available through the assistance of the social collectives for traffic safety. In recent years we have once again been able to increase their number. Currently, more than 305,000 citizens are working in the most diverse collectives for traffic safety. The number of traffic safety panels in factories, institutions, and cooperatives has also increased, as well as the number of panels in cities, communities, and residential areas. However, numerical size by itself should not be adduced as a measure. It is much more important to pursue steady development in the content and quality of the work of these collectives and to increase in an effective way their ability to reach the broadest possible segment of road users.

In October 1988 the "Joint Objectives of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, the Executive Committee of the FDGB [Free German Trade Unions], the National Council of the National Front of the GDR and the Central Council of the FDJ [Free German Youth] on The Activity and Methods of Working Groups for Safety on The Road and of the Social Collectives for Traffic

Safety in the GDR" was passed. Its goal is the further qualification and improvement in the effectiveness of state management of comprehensive accident prevention. This document summarizes and presents in general terms many years of tested material, from the prior work of the state and social committees to improve traffic discipline and safety.

The purpose of the Joint Objectives is to continue to implement the traffic safety program energetically, to further emphasize the assurance of traffic safety as a concern for society at large and to improve the quality and effectiveness of work in the area of traffic safety. This document is particularly valuable because joint tasks were established for state organs and social organizations. The intention is to continue to promote close collaboration—while still preserving individual responsibility. It concentrates on the broad deployment and refinement of comprehensive accident prevention. Our initial experiences in promoting the Joint Objectives show that this document has provided a truly tangible guide for joint action. One of the first visible expressions can be found, for example, in the preparation and execution of the central communal traffic education program, "Pedestrian Safety in Traffic," which was initiated for 1989 nationwide through the Central Work Group "Traffic Safety." In addition to the state organs and social organizations, the principal participants involved as expert advisors are the publications and the Institute for Traffic Safety at the College for Transportation Friedrich List.

The situation concerning traffic accidents in 1988 once again emphasizes the need to direct primary efforts in accident prevention steadily and logically on a broad basis toward actively eliminating the major causes of accidents, consistent education concerning the law and its enforcement, and the continued emphasis on society's overall responsibility for traffic safety.

Continuing to refine the forms and methods of the work of traffic safety and improving its effect is the task confronting primarily traffic safety research, scientists and those engaged in the practical work of traffic safety. We cannot be indifferent to the fact that, in spite of sustained efforts, the number of traffic accidents increased in 1988 by 2,013 (up 4.7 percent), 1,917 more persons (up 5.1 percent) were injured, and 66 more persons (up 4.8 percent) were killed in traffic accidents.

## HUNGARY

### Ivanyi on Economy, EC Potential, MSZMP Property

25000427a Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
23 Aug 89 p 5

[Article by Karoly Freesz: "The Debt Is Pregnant: It Will Be a Difficult Birth...; Pal Ivanyi's lecture at the MSZMP summer semester"]

[Text] "The situation is bad but not hopeless." One could summarize the analysis of Hungary's economic situation made by Pal Ivanyi, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Central Committee [CC] secretary, with this slogan. Ivanyi's statement was made in Tata, on the second day of the party's summer semester. In his 50 minute presentation Ivanyi told the audience that although our economy is still standing despite difficulties and that there is no danger of collapse, there continues to be no favorable shift. Production as a whole is stagnating, efficiency is not improving, and inflation is on the increase, thus creating a chance for an overt financial crisis. During the first half of the year the budget deficit amounted to 35 billion forints. They would like to reduce this amount to between 20 and 25 billion forints by the end of the year.

The CC secretary declared that at the moment the repayment of our foreign debts is creating a critical situation. The country's net indebtedness could increase by the end of the year by as much as \$1 billion, as compared to the present debt of \$13.5 billion. Our situation is made more difficult by the fact that in the upcoming 3 years our debt burden will gradually increase, while the country must repay \$11 billion. Interest payments are gradually increasing and amount to between \$1.3 and \$1.5 billion annually, since for years we have been paying off earlier loans with new ones. To offset these amounts we would need an annual economic growth rate of between 3 and 5 percentage points. At present the Hungarian economy is not capable of accomplishing this, and must therefore limit itself to moderating the pace at which it is becoming indebted. It cannot be regarded as a success that instead of a planned, long-term agreement we will probably be able to reach only a 1-year agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

Ivanyi then discussed the manner in which functional disturbances in CEMA may worsen our already difficult situation. At present, Hungary has a trade surplus vis-a-vis almost every other member country. The trade surplus with the Soviet Union has become almost depressing. By now it exceeds 500 million rubles, as compared to the 140-million-ruble level deemed acceptable earlier. A few years ago the Hungarian economy had settled its negative trade balance caused by losses in exchange rates through excess merchandise shipments. The present situation is reversed, but not one of our CEMA partners is capable of doing the same.

With regard to the evolution of the international market, Ivanyi said that of the socialist countries Hungary had reached the most favorable agreement with the European Economic Community. This agreement provides some benefits to Hungary only until 1992, because from the Hungarian standpoint trading conditions will be made more difficult as a result of the Western European Economic Union. In the more proximate future a small decline in the economic boom may be expected.

Having analyzed the international situation, Ivanyi discussed the conditions that influence the Hungarian economy. Above all he stressed that it is not appropriate to subordinate all of our endeavors to the preservation of our international solvency, because in and of itself this would not be enough to move us away from dead center. Our system of goals must be centered around modernizing the Hungarian economy. The only question is how much of the stringent measures needed to accomplish this can be realized without further sharpening political tensions. Several ideas that would contribute to the resolution of this matter have emerged, but they have not yet come together into a unified whole. First of all, "thanks" to inflation, society's limits of tolerance are diminishing. One and a half million people live near or below the existential minimum; the danger of impoverishment would threaten an even larger stratum under conditions of a more stringent economic policy. The economic rationale is unpopular. It would necessitate measures that further deteriorate the standard of living.

In this context Ivanyi addressed the issue of when it would be most appropriate to hold elections. In his view the party's and the country's interest would demand that elections be held as soon as possible. On the one hand unpopular measures could further weaken the MSZMP's election positions, while on the other hand it has become obvious that we cannot expect to receive substantial economic assistance from Western countries before holding elections.

Ivanyi responded to a number of questions after the presentation. He stated that a duty-free zone will be established shortly in the vicinity of Sopron, on an entrepreneurial basis. With regard to Hungary's chances of joining the Common Market, he said that a member country of the Warsaw Pact has no realistic chance of doing so. Regarding demands related to the distribution of MSZMP assets he said that to a certain extent these demands are viewed as just. The party's assets today are valued at between 7.2 and 7.3 billion forints. Since 1978, however, all these assets have been owned by the state, and the MSZMP exercises only management rights. The party would be willing to repay about 2.1 billion forints received in state contributions—the amount it has received since 1978. In exchange for relinquishing management rights, however, it would like to exercise ownership rights over its remaining properties.

#### **Soviets Upset International Railroad Schedules**

*25000424c Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
25 Aug 89 p 4*

[Text] Since the middle of July delayed arrivals of international express trains originating in the Soviet Union have become regular phenomena. Andras Meszaros, Hungarian State Railroads [MAV] deputy director, said at yesterday's press conference that the extent of delays is on the increase. The delay, which has become permanent in the case of the Budapest Express, has caused disturbances in the departure of trains from

Budapest and destined for Zagreb, Rome, and Torino. The Yugoslav railroads called MAV's attention to the fact that if they are unable to connect the direct sleeping cars of the Budapest Express arriving from Moscow to the connecting Drava Express bound for Zagreb on time, they will not wait for the railroad cars arriving with the Maestral, scheduled to leave 6 hours later, and will dispatch the international train without those cars on the Istanbul-Paris run.

The MAV deputy director met with his corresponding Soviet colleagues, but was unable to report any particular results at yesterday's press conference. He said that MAV had offered the services of its Zahony axle changing unit and work force in the most urgent cases, hoping that this way the change from the narrow to the wide track could be sped up. Soviet railroad officials responded by saying that the Soviet customs and border guard units at Csap insist on the one and a half hour inspection period.

MAV has begun several initiatives to normalize the situation. As a first step, the Zahony MAV directorate sent a telegram to its partner, the Ungvar Soviet railroad directorate. They subsequently contacted the Soviet Minister of Railroad Affairs. Finally, MAV headquarters directorate contacted the Soviet Union's commercial outpost in Budapest. Thus far they have received only a verbal promise that Soviet authorities will examine the situation.

MAV executives have decided that if the Budapest Express from Moscow is delayed by more than 90 minutes, beginning on 19 August the direct sleeping cars from Moscow to Yugoslavia and Italy will run only to Budapest, according to the original schedule. In such cases, passengers in these sleeping cars could continue their trip to Zagreb several hours later on other international trains. Refund claims resulting from the delay may be presented by passengers to the Soviet Railroads.

#### **Tax Office Issues Economic Report**

*25000424d Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
28 Aug 89 p 1*

[Text] During the first half of this year, venture, enterprise, and cooperative sales revenues increased much more rapidly than last year, and profitability was more favorable. This conclusion is based on a report prepared by the Taxation and Financial Control Office [APEH], based on financial reports.

APEH Chairman Dezso Suto stated that during the first half of the year sales revenues registered by enterprises increased faster than during the same period the previous year—by about 20 percent—even though production stagnated. Expanded sales were achieved in part by increased exports subject to settlement in dollars; entrepreneurial exports subject to settlement in convertible currencies increased by 36 percent. This would have a beneficial effect on the country's external financial balance under any circumstances. On the other hand, the

greater than planned expansion of exports subject to settlement in rubles is an unfavorable phenomenon. This expansion took place despite central measures to moderate the growth. Rapid sales revenue increases were also enhanced by the fact that producer prices increased at a higher rate than planned.

The financial situation of enterprises was far more favorable during the 6-month period than has been stated by business and industry managers, according to APEH. Their profits increased by about 40 percent, and profitability in the financial institutions branch increased particularly quickly. (This is noteworthy because last year banks and financial institutions increased their profits rapidly—a matter that became the subject of objections by enterprise executives.) Certain favorable tendencies could also be detected in the management of expenses. Overall, enterprise expenses increased more slowly—by about 15 percent—than sales revenues. This signals the fact that sensitivity toward costs has gained strength. The situation has also improved with respect to material costs. At the same time, the outflow of wages was very strong; an actual competition in wages evolved. At the same time, however, achievements did not increase proportionately.

It is a favorable phenomenon that the subsidy content of enterprise profits has substantially decreased. This indicates that the government's program to reduce subsidies has advanced, even though the decrease in subsidies has not reached the planned levels.

#### **Expansion of Paks Nuclear Power Plant Postponed**

25000468b Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
14 Sep 89 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed article: "Do We Need a New Nuclear Power Plant? Press Conference at Paks"]

[Text] When are Blocs 5 and 6 of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant going to be built? Is there a need at all to expand the power plant? These were the questions answered at yesterday's press conference in Paks.

Investment Director Janos Marton prognosticated Hungary's anticipated energy needs: Even if we are confident in a less energy demanding future Hungarian economy, there will be a need for a new basic power plant within 8-10 years. Hungary will be forced to do this as a result of the current condition of Hungarian power plants, and because our most significant electrical energy supplier, the Soviet Union, is also struggling with concerns. And as long as this is the case, the only issue subject to debate is what kind of power plant we should choose. Arguments supportive of nuclear power plants include the fact that nuclear power plants are gentle to the environment and that the unit cost of energy produced is low. (At the Gagarin Thermal Power Plant energy production costs 2.5 times more than at Paks.)

A complex environmental impact analysis of the nuclear power plant was made in 1987. Dr Jozsef Ronaky, chief engineer of the enterprise's nuclear directorate, said that like all nuclear power plants, the planned Blocs 5 and 6 at Paks could be described as friendly to the environment, and there are special security provisions which guarantee that radioactive materials will not escape. In the summertime, the temperature of the Danube water used to cool the power plant may reach 30 degrees, and may exceed that temperature for a few days. It is obvious that much more will be said about the dangers this presents to animal and plant life in the water. Experts are certain, however, that the effects caused by the water cooling system can be improved.

The Paks Nuclear Power Plant expansion would utilize two reactors developed in the Soviet Union, each with a 1,000-megawatt capacity. An intergovernmental agreement between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union governs the planning and establishment of the power plant, as well as the shipment of equipment. The agreement calls for the two blocs to be placed into operation in 1994 and 1996 respectively. These deadlines have been changed since the agreement was signed. In the opinion of the Hungarian Electrical Works Trust, the start-up date for Bloc 5 may be postponed until 1998. Bloc 6 should be producing electrical energy for the first time in the year 2000. Based on 1988 prices, the entire investment would cost 102 billion forints.

This concept will be submitted for societal debate following the receipt of comments by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Industry. Based on the above, the National Assembly will decide whether to expand the Paks facility.

#### **New Energy Policy Proposed**

25000464b Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
16 Sep 89 p 4

[Interview with Imre Szabo, Industry Ministry state secretary, by Judit Kozma: "A Need for a New Jamburg: Next Basic Power Plant in the Year 2000"; date and place not given]

[Text] A conference on natural gas begins today at Balatonszeplak. The national conference gains timely significance because the energy policy designed by the Ministry of Industry is designating a greater role for natural gas. We asked State Secretary Imre Szabo about this concept.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Various criticisms have been levied against the energy policy from many sides. Most recently the excessive import dependence was the focal point of debate, but you are frequently blamed for committing too much of the country's resources. How much of the criticism do you accept?

[Szabo] Energy policy must respond to many conflicting requirements. Most importantly, it is a fundamental requirement that in the next decade there be no highly



capital intensive investments. We must reduce our import dependence, or at least base our imports on multiple sources. We must satisfy environmental protection requirements. There is a need to reduce the concentration of electrical energy producing establishments; it would be appropriate to produce electrical energy in several smaller power plants, rather than in one large plant. And, of course, we must choose the most economical solution. We must endeavor to improve efficiency in energy transformation. It is necessary for us to participate more in international energetics systems, and finally, we must ensure secure service provisions as much as possible.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You mentioned last the requirement for secure service provisions. Was this a mere coincidence or does it mean that the energy policy concept has changed? In earlier days secure service provisions ranked above everything else.

[Szabo] The fact that I mentioned the requirement for service provisions last is a coincidence. On the other hand, I do believe that we must abandon the outlook which disregards cost in energy supplies. This program represents a crisis strategy and contains many uncertain factors and risks. The risk is in the fact that the program is based on a minimum developmental trend. It is based on the supposition that not only will the needed energy saving measures continue to be enforced in the economy, but structural change will begin, and as a result of this, energy consumption at the people's economy level will increase only 1.5 percent. If this is the case, we may postpone the scheduled date of operation for the next basic power plant from 1995, as planned earlier, to 1998 or 2000. At the same time, increased demand could be satisfied by combined cycle gas turbine power plants.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How much of an increase in capacity do you consider adequate?

[Szabo] Between 700 and 900 megawatts.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is there going to be enough natural gas to accomplish this?

[Szabo] The fuel consumption of gas turbines can be satisfied only through additional imports. Just for this purpose we will need an additional 1.5 cubic meters of natural gas, over and above the quantity specified in the Jamburg Hungarian-Soviet basic agreement.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is there an agreement to that effect or are you counting on other resources?

[Szabo] Above all, we are counting on Soviet imports, because the way we see it, the Soviet Union is inclined to deliver additional quantities of natural gas. There is no agreement to that effect at this time; that will be a future task.

[NEPSZABADSAG] And if the price of such an agreement is another Jamburg?

[Szabo] At that time we will seek out other resources, particularly if we settle our balances with the Soviet Union in convertible currencies. We will, of course, have to do our calculations at world market prices.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Returning to the program, in your view the energetics sphere passes the ball to the processing industry. It endeavors to surrender as many investments as possible, at the same time however, from an energy standpoint, you expect to see structural transformation. But what are you going to do if all this does not take place?

[Szabo] We also made calculations for this eventuality. In that case the additional capacity needed will not be 700 megawatts, but at least 1,200 megawatts before the basic power plant can become operational. Since gas turbines can be constructed in a relatively short period of time, the program is capable of adapting itself to this scenario, at significant additional cost, of course.

[NEPSZABADSAG] And in conclusion, when will this program go into effect? When can we expect a government decision on energy policy?

[Szabo] Societal debate over the program is in progress; we have essentially completed our reconciliation with the opposition organizations. The program may be submitted to Parliament's committee on industry and to the Council of Ministers this year.

## POLAND

### Continued Financial, Economic Cooperation With Israel Viewed

26000683 Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish  
No 89, 27 Jul 89 p 8

[Interview with Zbigniew Karcz, director, Polish Security Bank (PKO) branch in Tel Aviv, by Monica Sowa: "The Polish Bank in Israel"; date and place not given]

[Text] [RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] I understand that your bank is one of the oldest in Israel.

[Karcz] That is correct. The Tel Aviv branch was established on 15 May 1939. Not many of our early competitors were able to survive on this market for over half a century. The PKO Polish Security Bank itself in Warsaw was formed exactly 60 years ago. Its goal was to give financial and economic assistance to Polish emigrants. This goal was clearly reflected in the geographic structure of the foreign branches which were established in the 1930's. They were established, in order, in the United States, France and Argentina. The fourth branch was established in Tel Aviv. Although the emigration to what was then Palestine was not just of an economic nature but also of an ethnic nature, our branch performed functions similar to those of other foreign branches of the PKO Bank. The over half-century presence of the bank in Tel Aviv was expressed also in the fact that there, as in Poland, October is "savings month." This is

the result of an advertising campaign conducted by our bank and its branches even before the war, urging that savings be deposited into bank accounts on a regular basis.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] How did the Tel Aviv branch fare in later years?

[Karcz] During the war our operations were very limited but, among other things, we served the Polish soldiers in General Anders' army which was stationed in Palestine. After the state of Israel was established and economic contacts were made with Poland, a very good political climate for bilateral economic cooperation appeared. This was a period of exceptional prosperity for our bank. Poland, at that time, settled its accounts with Israel on the basis of a clearing agreement and the Tel Aviv branch handled all of the related financial work. During this period, the branch also entered into cooperation with other socialist countries, including Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Hungary. Of the socialist states, only Poland had (and has) its own branch in Israel.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] How were you able to survive the 30 years during which there were no economic and political contacts between Poland and Israel?

[Karcz] I must admit that when diplomatic, and most importantly, trade relations, with Israel were severed, we did not expect that it would be so long before they would be renewed. The maintaining of the branch in Tel Aviv during this long and difficult period cost us a great deal because our main object of operations—the financing of economic cooperation between Poland and Israel—disappeared and we had to concern ourselves primarily with serving our local clients. At that time, even the official status of the branch changed: We became the Paris agency of the PKO bank. But practical considerations and the belief that no political conflict lasts forever worked in our favor. It is very difficult for a foreign bank to obtain a license to operate in Israel, and in many other countries also. Therefore, it was almost certain that if we abandon it we will never again return to this market.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] After 20 years of "separation" and despite the absence of diplomatic relations, for more or less 3 years economic, tourist and cultural relations between Poland and Israel are becoming increasingly livelier. Does this mean that a new period of prosperity is beginning for your bank?

[Karcz] We hope so, although there is nothing automatic about this. We must take into account the fact that during the past 20 years commercial exchange between the two countries did not cease entirely. It merely took on a camouflaged form. It was conducted with the help of foreign intermediaries headquartered mainly in West Berlin, the FRG, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland. Now, despite the fact that direct trade can be conducted between enterprises in Poland and Israel, the foreign intermediaries are trying at all costs to continue their previous functions. Of course, I admit that sometimes

such intermediation is the best way to make these connections, but not always. That is why I strongly urge Polish production and foreign trade enterprises to establish direct contacts. The western intermediary's commissions in exchanges with Israel may make up a very important part of the contract's cost.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] I understand that in trading with Israel through foreign intermediaries Polish enterprises automatically bypass your bank because, as a rule, behind every one of these intermediaries there is a financial institution connected with it. But do not all of those who are now beginning to trade with Israel directly become your clients?

[Karcz] Unfortunately no. Unfortunately not only for the bank but also, and perhaps primarily, for these firms, because the selection of our branch to handle the finances connected with the execution of a contract is often a guarantee that the matter will be taken care of more speedily. Our bank has open accounts in Polish banks. That is why payments clear immediately, i.e., within a few days. Other banks located in Israel—both local and those with mixed capital—do not have this ability. Therefore, they must make payments through one, and sometimes even two, intermediaries, e.g., through an American or Italian bank. As a result, payments take a few weeks to clear. Use of our bank's services, therefore, means an important savings in foreign-exchange expenditures. In a \$1 million contract, this represents a savings of \$2,500 to \$5,000.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] In addition to fast action, what else does the PKO Bank branch in Tel Aviv have to offer potential clients?

[Karcz] During the last 2 years we have greatly increased our initial capital. As a result, we now have an exceptionally high capital-to-assets ratio. It is 17 percent, while the International Settlements Bank in Basel recommends 8 percent and most banks have much less. Simply speaking, we are now very able to grant loans and wish we did not have to give credit only to Israeli clients. We must underscore the fact that although most of the foreign branches of Polish banks service mainly trade with Poland, in our branch the situation is exactly the opposite. Over 95 percent of our operations consist of services to the local market. What this says is that we are handling the accounts of local firms and individuals, settling their transactions, granting loans, handling securities, etc.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] Has the improvement in the political climate and the beginnings of the rebuilding of economic relations, therefore, not done the branch any good?

[Karcz] We are already offering some services to Polish clients. For example, we are handling the accounts of Poland's Business in Israel Section, Orbis and LOT (Polish Air Lines), we are granting credits to purchasers of Polish goods and we are granting export credits. But most of the Polish-Israel trade exchange continues to

take place without our participation. We estimate that in addition to the "camouflaged" turnovers, i.e., those executed through intermediaries in the western countries, in which we do not participate at all, our branch settles scarcely 15 percent of the Poland-Israel direct turnovers. This means that the financial services performed in connection with trade amount to approximately \$3 million a year. It is no wonder that we are not satisfied.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] What do you see as the reason why Polish enterprises do not take advantage of the services that the PKO Bank branch in Tel Aviv offers?

[Karcz] There are several reasons. First, not everyone knows that our branch even exists in Israel and is ready to perform various kinds of services. Second, contacts with a bank continue to be regarded as an evil necessity, and not as a means of obtaining valuable financial and economic information. Because we have been functioning on the Israeli market for over half a century, we know a great deal about it. Therefore, we can protect Polish contractors against the signing of an agreement with a nonexistent or insolvent partner (and such cases have already occurred). We can also sometimes make suggestions regarding a commercial contract or other form of economic cooperation. Third, we often see that Polish enterprises ignore the clauses in a contract which pertain to financial questions.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] How are we to interpret this?

[Karcz] Businessmen from Poland as a rule do not discuss the problem of the selection of the bank which will service the contract. Without giving it any thought, they usually agree to the bank the foreign partner chooses, instead of, as an alternate solution, proposing their own bank, i.e., a Polish bank. Once, while examining one of the contracts on which we were to handle the account, I came across a clause in which the Polish foreign-trade enterprise committed itself to obtain a guarantee from a foreign bank. Astounded by this, I telephoned the other party in the contract, one of my regular clients, and asked him whether our bank's guarantee would not be sufficient for him. It turned out that the clause was a part of the standard version of the contract, therefore it did not occur to the Polish side to question it and make some changes. And such guarantees cost money.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] In a word, Polish enterprises should choose branches of Polish banks for more than just patriotic reasons.

[Karcz] It is not a question of patriotism, but one's own interest. Although we should not be ashamed of patriotism either. In today's business world, it is entirely normal for enterprises to take advantage of the financial and economic advice of the banks with which they are connected. The participation of banks in certain enterprises is automatic and its services are used from the

very first stage of contract negotiation and preparation. Polish enterprises, thus far, have not felt the need for this and therefore experienced various kinds of financial surprises. Meanwhile, our branch is always ready to verify a potential contractor's financial status and assist in formulating the financial clauses in a contract. I also wish to add that reform in Polish foreign trade makes it increasingly necessary for enterprises to work with banks. For example, there is the problem of guarantees. In the past it was assumed that it is impossible for a foreign trade enterprise to become bankrupt, because its solvency is guaranteed by the Polish government. Now we know that this is not so. Therefore, banks must now post guarantees, naturally after the enterprise fulfills the necessary security requirements.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] What is your branch doing to recover its lost position, i.e., to obtain Polish clients?

[Karcz] We are now conducting a wide-scale advertising campaign in connection with the 60th anniversary of the PKO Bank in Warsaw. We are offering various types of services, guaranteeing bank secrecy, to say nothing of solvency. We are prepared to give all kinds of assistance in restoring normal economic relations with Israel and we are trying to overcome the skepticism of Polish enterprises towards direct contacts in this country. We must remember that Israel is not simply a producer of beautiful oranges. It also has a modern farm-produce processing industry, including the latest achievements in plant and animal genetics and some biotechnologies. It is also one of the largest suppliers of cut flowers. Opportunities for cooperation may be available in this area, because for a period of 3 months in the summer Israel cannot supply fresh flowers; the climate is too hot and dry to grow them during those months. And precisely at that time flowers in Poland are the cheapest and they can very likely be sold to Israeli distributors to ensure continuity of delivery.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] As an observer of the Israeli marketplace, what other possibilities of cooperation occur to you?

[Karcz] Israel is definitely a giant in the field of diamonds, but it also has a well-developed textile, chemical and electronics industry. I see great opportunities for cooperation in those fields. Poland's garment factories suffer from chronic shortages of raw materials. Probably flax can be sold in Israel in return for cotton. We must remember that Israel's imports now total \$13 billion a year. Some of this, in advance, is allocated for export. Prices on this market are attractive, i.e., high. All of this, therefore, is conducive to cooperation. Yet at this time only one Polish company operates there—Italmex, actually its Italian branch. We are hoping that after the recent visits by many heads of foreign-trade enterprises and government representatives, economic cooperation will be accelerated. How long can one trade with Israel via Vienna or West Berlin?

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] And what about the accomplishment of the initial goal of your bank, i.e., to assist the new Polish emigration? So far as I know, there already is such an emigration in Israel...

[Karcz] Certainly that will never again be our primary activity, but we are doing and will continue to do everything for Poles which is in keeping with local regulations. The Israeli foreign-exchange law states that during the first one-and-a-half months of his stay, a foreigner can send any amount of money abroad. After that, he can send money if he has a work permit. Nor should we forget about the bank's "traditional" activity, i.e., the acceptance of orders for domestic export and "A" accounts from families and friends living in Israel permanently. We have been specialists in this for years. There have even been cases where Israeli banks have sent clients to us for issuance of money orders to Poland. These are usually small sums and these institutions have a lot of trouble finding banks which have open accounts in Polish banks.

[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE] Thank you for the interview.

### **Contradiction Seen in State-Economy Relationship**

26000690 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY  
in Polish No 31, 30 Jul 89 p 5

[Article by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, founding member, Union for Real Politics: "The Economic Domain"; first paragraph is PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY introduction]

[Text] Is everything different? It appeared that we had told each other everything. It may be that after 4 June it is not that obvious anymore. This prompts some authors to address certain topics again.

Have you ever tried to translate the term "przemysł państwowy" [state industry] into English? A computer would translate: "state industry" [given in English in the original text], upon which an English speaker would think that this absurdity denotes "what the state engages in," that is, waging wars, maintaining order, and so on, just as "royal art" means the occupations which the kings devote themselves to, such as awarding orders, and so on.

Therefore, let us try a different tack: "national industry" [given in English in the original text]? Unfortunately, this means "domestic industry," and not necessarily state-owned. "Nationalized industry" [given in English in the original text] would not work either, because it would mean exactly the industry which has been nationalized...

Of course, it can be translated, for example, as "state-owned industry" [given in English in the original text]. However, it is obvious that this expression is unnatural, and this is a reflection of the fact that in a normal country the existence of state industry is an absurdity.

The difficulty rests in the very notion of "state." For an Englishman, "the state" amounts to the machinery of oppression, officials, barracks, and government buildings. When someone says that he is standing on state territory this means that he is standing on a land lot belonging to the Crown. Meanwhile, for a Pole the territory of the state is equated with the territory of the country. Land, even private land, is considered to be a part of the Polish State. There is but a step from this to the conviction that a private owner of land derives his title from the state.

The notion of unrestricted private property is a product of a long period of history, and socialists of every stripe (from internationalists to national socialists) have destroyed the foundations of the long-built European order by undermining the blissful certainty of owners.

In giving up the claim to the entirety, the Court frequently reserved for itself the king's domain, and was frequently obligated to maintain from this domain the entire state, including the police and the army, resorting to the armed militia of citizens only in the event of a threat by some uncivilized enemy. At present, this state domain embraces about one-half of the economy of the country (the cost of modern weapons may be the reason)—from 30 percent in the United States to between 70 and 80 percent in Poland or Sweden (meaning control rather than technical ownership; however, in the United States, for example, about one-half of the land is owned by the state).

Only competition on the part of countries which have boldly bet on the private sector, such as the Pacific Tigers, has forced senile state apparatuses to consider handing this domain out or selling it to citizens. Ultimately, their industriousness is the very battery powering the state; every citizen included in the apparatus ceases to be a part of the battery, and becomes a part of the specialized machine consuming energy.

When the apparatus lacks energy it has two solutions: streamline the operation of the battery (that is, the society on which it parasitizes) by eliminating the unnecessary parts of the apparatus and returning apparatus members to the economy) or by sinking the tentacles deeper and creating appendices making it possible to draw more energy from the weakening battery. In the long run, the latter solution drains the battery completely.

Henceforth, I will refer to the apparatus of the state proper, what is termed "the state" in English, as the state. In turn, I will refer to all of the domains, economic appendages which weaken the society as "the economic domain." This term has been accepted in Slavic languages. I would note that by virtue of this, economic operations performed by the state are something natural in the Slavic Realm, unlike in the sphere of Anglo-Saxon culture.



Therefore, in newspeak, the state consists of two parts: the state proper and the economic domain. The economic domain also exists in England. When, for example, the Labor Party began to nationalize more and more industries (with sad results), they were creating economic domains. However—and this is an essential difference—these economic domains were carefully separated from the state. These were "corporations" which the state endowed with a charter, assets, and funds, but which subsequently operated in the market independently. It is a fact that state officials always supported the corporations more or less discreetly, the reason, however, being that these were Labor Party officials with definite political sympathies. Favoring the economic domain in the line of their statutory duty and especially combining these two functions was rather out of the question.

In our country, the situation is entirely different. The state and the economic domain are the same apparatus which is a remnant of the totalitarian model (even at present). Thus, the very enlightened Minister Mr. Mieczysław Wilczek performs two functions simultaneously: the manager of a certain part of the economic domain called "state industry" and the minister of industry in a normal state.

These roles are contradictory to a great extent. If Mr. Wilczek appears as the advocate of "his" factory, his objective is for it not to have competition, if he appears as the minister administering industry, then he wants competition to develop, because in this case industry is healthy and the consumer is happy. Thus far, Mr. Wilczek has been coping well, which I admire because I would have definitely developed schizophrenia under the circumstances.

The advantage Mr. Wilczek has over the previous ministers, and the enthusiasm of the press on his account, are not due to him being in some special position but to the fact that he is not a person from "the economic domain." After all, until now the minister of railroads always was a railroad specialist, or a person looking at this industry from the point of view of the economic domain rather than social interest. Also, Mr. Wilczek is not a representative of the consumers as he ought to be, but at least he comes from a company which is a competitor of the economic domain, and this already amounts to something! (The background of popularity of Mr. Henryk Stokłosa from Pila, "the man who stopped Solidarity," is similar).

Confusing the state with the economic domain does not embrace only the executive authorities. Let us look at the parliament. The Sejm makes decisions on many economic problems in Poland. It makes decisions, but in what capacity? On the one hand, it is the council of trustees of the economic domain (which employs 17 million employees, an overwhelming majority of whom are Polish citizens), and on the other hand, a representative of 40 million citizens (as well as the traditions of their ancestors and interests of our descendants—which

should not be forgotten). It is obvious that the interests of producers and consumers are generally contradictory. We must state with sadness that the Sejm usually leans toward taking into account the point of view of the economic domain (because these 17 million are an organized force) and neglects the 40 million (including the above 17 million!!!) scattered in homes and shops.

Unfortunately, the judicial authority is not an exception as well. It is obvious that the state is interested in the laws being stable and serious. However, what is to be done when some crafty fellow begins milking the economic domain legally, using laws? At present, the court frequently happens to uphold the law; however, not so long ago the courts collectively acknowledged the superiority of "social interests" over "legal formalism," and handed down verdicts protecting the economic domains.

When we come down from the heights to the level of powiats the picture appears worse yet. Unless I am mistaken, the infamous "Koszalin" verdict was rendered after 13 December. The point was that an enterprise rented from a citizen a villa for its employees to spend their leave. The leave was spent there, and the enterprise paid, and everything was all right, for a while... An audit team from the central office of the economic domain arrived at the enterprise and revealed that the enterprise had paid more than the internal regulations of the economic domain allowed...

Incidentally, the entire civil and penal codes are full of paragraphs establishing a separate procedure for treating the economic domain. In this case, article 384, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code was certainly at issue: The Council of Ministers or, by its delegated authority, another main organ of state administration may establish general conditions or standard contracts for a particular category of contracts between units of the socialized sector or between these units and other persons. Also, there is paragraph 2: The regulations envisaged by the previous paragraph may set forth within which bounds contractual settlements different from the conditions set or standard contracts are inadmissible. Also, article 385, paragraph 1: A statute issued by a party so entitled by appropriate regulations and within the confines of these regulations, as well as a statute confirmed by the appropriate state organ, bind the other party if it has been given to this party at the signing of the contract, if using the statute in the relations of a given kind is customarily accepted, and also in the event the other party could have easily found out what the content of the statute is.

As is easy to see, the above regulations (together with one-half of the civil code, as has been said) should belong in the administrative rather than civil law—after all, what bearing do the internal regulations of the economic domain have on one not working for the economic domain? However, the statist (proponents of the state grabbing for itself as much as possible) deliberately try to obscure the difference between the internal regulations of the economic domain and the state law. As a result,

not too many citizens know that technically they could not care less about the content of MONITOR RZADOWY, and only DZIENNIK USTAW is in effect for them. After all, it may be better that they do not know this, because only the most enlightened and persevering ones will succeed in winning what is theirs. As a rule, the cost of fighting for it is higher than the gain... The courts never award damages to be paid by the economic domain which cover the real cost of court battles!

This is hardly surprising. Awarding damages is a benefit for the state ("Justice is the pillar of power of the Republic") but a loss for the economic domain. Meanwhile, the budget of the state (which, after all, pays the judge) is derived from the economic domain (at least technically).

Here is one more example. Say, I run a transportation company in England, and I am beginning to suspect that my drivers make unreported hauls. I call the traffic police asking them to check on my drivers...

...to which some sergeant responds: "Sorry, sir, but the taxpayer pays me my salary in order to maintain order on the roads. For your private business you will have to hire in-house inspectors. Perhaps, you would not like the police to watch over your shops and monitor whether everyone is working properly?"

Meanwhile, we regard it as absolutely normal that in Poland the traffic police inspects the vehicles of the economic domain! Moreover, it inspects their waybills, or an internal document! This obviously runs counter to the principles of the economic reform, because a private shipper must get himself his own inspection, whereas the inspection of the economic domain operates at taxpayer's expense.

This can go on forever. The state and the economic domain are bound to each other at virtually every level. Now is the time for conclusions:

The state and the economic domain must be completely separated from each other. There will be no order or healthy economy for as long as the functionaries of the economic domain are certain that the state officials will come to the rescue, for much the same reason due to which a soccer team which is helped on the field every step of the way by a magician forcing the football into the goal of the opponent will not know how to play several games later.

This calls for not only the institutional separation (of the prosecutor's office of the economic domain from prosecution in the name of the Republic), but also a personal separation. The function of the state is to spend (sparingly) the money of the taxpayer, whereas that of the economic domain is to make money (at least in theory, because actually it is not quite working out). These are absolutely different functions; a person who is suitable for one of these functions is almost certainly not for the other. The chairman of "General Motors" in the capacity of U.S. President would most likely sell the

country, maybe, for a good price... And the other way around: Officials kill industriousness by their excessive caution.

The economic domain separated out (not in the form of the "Fund of National Assets" because the land on which the Belvedere [Palace] is located should not be included there) should, as a corporation, become a corporate person and assume the entire state debt. This calls for an entire array of legal arrangements, including changes in the constitution. The latter should include an explicit provision that the state has no right to perform economic operations, interfere in them, own production assets, or receive or give loans (the last function belongs to private banks and the National Bank). It is not a function of the state.

Subsequently, the economic domain should be sold to private holders, and it does not matter who they are. For practical reasons, I envisage preferences for the "nomenklatura," employees of a given enterprise, and Polish citizens, let us say, at 40 and 10 percent. I have already written about this many times. I will only note that I do not agree with Jerzy Baczynski (POLITYKA, No 25, 1988) on one point: Employee councils or self-government bodies should not have any say in this matter. The assets do not belong to the workforce, but to the entire people, and preferences (that is, lower prices) in purchasing the shares are due to the conviction that it is economically favorable for the employees to have shares of their own company rather than the desire to compensate the workforces for the actual influence which they have *de facto* if not *de jure*. (Sales at lower prices are a compromise between handouts as proposed by Krawczyk, Szomburg, and Lewandowski and a sale). I also note that the shares should not be sold to the creditors of the People's Republic of Poland but at an open auction. I find it unfortunate that an interview with my esteemed colleague Professor Witold Trzeciakowski for GAZETA WYBORCZA suggested that he proposes to sell only to the creditors. This is undoubtedly a *lapsus pennae*: Open bids produce higher prices; besides, why should a Polish billionaire be deprived of an opportunity to purchase shares of a Polish enterprise?

The sale of the economic domain may take a long time (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher has sold only a half in 10 years!). There is no reason to be in too much of a hurry. However, the budget of the economic domain and that of the state should be separated immediately (the latter budget should include only two items on the "revenue" side—"tax revenue" and "revenue from the economic domain").

The shares may be sold to cover the debt; that much is clear: A bankrupt [enterprise] needs to be auctioned off. Ultimately, it is not the state that borrowed money but the economic domain. E. Gierek did not contract loans to pay the officials but to enhance the economic domain. The creditors should thus leave our state and our country alone! It is a fact that the state has been spending funds received from the economic domain; however, the state

does not have to be ashamed of that (in turn, it has to spend this money reasonably and with moderation, but this is another matter). It is also a fact that, in saying that the debt of the state called "United States" is about \$1 trillion, they count within it the debt (perhaps, over 90 percent) to its own banks and citizens. If we throw in all "budget deficits" in our country (in this half-year alone, the citizens are being robbed of about \$4 billion by inflation), forcible "loans" to the state beginning with "nationalization," and so on—then it would turn out that the debt of the state called "the People's Republic of Poland" is greater than the debt of the United States.

The state released from the burden of the economic domain will finally operate properly. It will operate at less expense. It will not feel duty bound to buy engines at the Cegielski Plant—if Taiwanese engines turn out to be cheaper, it will buy them (incidentally: The railroads are going to be private, but what about, say, tanks?). It will make no difference at all for the state whether the FSO [Passenger Car Factory] purchases a license from FIAT or Toyota, or whether the FSO itself is bought out by, say, Hyundai.

The state will live off taxes, and, therefore, will be interested in its subjects being numerous and rich (the economic domain is, of course, interested in us making as little money as possible, because its profit depends on this!!). The citizens will start getting rich on the basis of stable and just laws...

...and in as little as a year we will not recognize Poland. Certainly, we are going to have problems with immigrant workers and millionaires forcing their way to Poland in order to operate here. However, we will manage somehow!

#### **Fine Line Between Economic Reform, Potential 'Revolution' Viewed**

26000682b Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
11-14 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by Danuta Zagrodzka: "Budgetary Disaster"]

[Text] It was really clear from the beginning that the budget which the old government proposed, somewhat posthumously, was not acceptable to the opposition.

"To confirm the budget is to confirm an economic policy which we do not accept," said Senator Andrzej Machalski at one of the three meetings of the Senate Commission on the National Economy. But the budget act was so violated that in accordance with the law it had to be returned to the parliament scarcely 6 months after it was passed. Also, for purely practical reasons, at the end of August the limit on expenditures for this year will be reached. But the government cannot stop paying its bills, despite the fact that in the opinion of the opposition there should first be a fundamental debate on the state of the economy—the draft amendment cannot be simply rejected. The formula which was conceived in order not to paralyze the state and enter into other

disputes is probably acceptable. It was agreed that expenditures can be exceeded for a month or two, but new sources of income cannot be sought. If the Senate and Sejm approve this, we will gain time for the necessary discussion and our own economic program. But money without coverage will still flow abundantly and the matter will not disappear.

The problem, as a matter of fact, comes down to this: How to introduce a tough money policy without bringing about a revolution.

In the opinion of the experts—Profs Mieczyslaw Kucharski and Karol Lutkowski—the government draft does not guarantee this. Prof Cezary Jozefiak gave a crushing opinion on the government document. He asked himself two important questions: Why did the budget break down during the first half of the year and will the proposed changes (a 60-percent growth in expenditures and incomes and a 70-percent growth in deficit) lead to elimination of the structural defects in our economy.

The answer to the second question is "no." As always, according to the government, society is to blame for the fact that spending limits were exceeded because it put pressure on wages, which made it necessary to increase subsidies, as well as flawed regulations which made it difficult for the financial apparatus to collect payments on time. These reasons, according to Professor Jozefiak, are true but they are not complete and create a false picture of the situation. The only way to be free from pressure is to stop being a party to wage disputes. And this can occur by removing ownership from the state. The government did nothing in this matter. On the other hand, it chose a substitute solution in the form of coterie-state companies which further contributed to the breakdown of the financial system and the monopolization of the economy. The government also yielded to the illusion that equilibrium can be achieved through a growth in prices. It fell into the "subsidy trap" (43 percent of state expenditures—over 10 billion zlotys) gaining nothing from the changes. In the opinion of the Supreme Chamber of Control, "the ministry of finances did just about everything to bring the central budget to disaster."

Senator Alexander Paszynski said that the minister of finances should stand before the Tribunal of State for this disaster. But Minister A. Wroblewski, present at Wednesday's meeting, did not give the impression of a person being censured. I even got the impression that he feels that he has done his duty well. In any case, the questions addressed to him, contrary to expectations, were rather mild, and as they went on, were extremely detailed which allowed him to escape from basic matters to technical ones. The tragic aspect of the situation, which probably not all of the senators sufficiently realize, dissipated somewhere as a result. All matters connected with financing of the militia and the army evoked lively and penetrating inquiries. This is unquestionably a sensitive point which, in any case, cannot be solved in

budget entries, but the hopes connected with savings in this area are probably too great. As Sen Andrzej Wielowiejski said, on Lech Kaczynski's desk in Gdansk lie applications for increases from a million unionists for a sum of 1.5 billion zlotys. Everyone is waiting for a wage increase at the expense of the ministry of national defense and the ministry of internal affairs. This is an illusion, but at the same time it is an extremely difficult problem, and not for the budget alone.

One of the conditions for halting the inflation which is strictly connected with the budget—everywhere—is social calm and agreement by the trade unions to limit their demands. What kind of government in Poland can achieve this? I am no longer even sure that it is our government, considering the overall suspicion, distrust, and above all, the standard of living. That is the real problem that we are facing and not even a Tribunal of State for the government will free us of it.

#### **Copper Mill Seeks Foreign Production, Modernization Aid**

26000682a Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 79, 4 Jul 89 p 8

[Article by Anna Rzechowska: "Nonferrous Metallurgy Is Looking for Partners"]

[Text] Polish copper does not need advertising, at least not in Poznan. International certificates guarantee its quality. We obtain world-market prices for the cathodes and wire bars registered on the London Metals Exchange.

Production and export programs were finalized a few years ago for the following: Mining on the order of 29-30 million tons a year, production of approximately 380,000-390,000 tons of electrolytic metal for foreign markets—over 180,000 tons a year. Given this, it would appear that the presence of the representatives of the Copper Mining and Metallurgy Works from Lubin at the Poznan International Fair is perhaps not so much unnecessary as it is of a prestige nature. Not just in the opinion of lay people and many traders outside of IMPEX-METAL, the copper sells itself. What, then, is the copper giant doing in Poznan?

The answer should be sought in the fact that in accordance with the general trend of our economy, the Works plans to invest in the efficient processing of its basic raw material, which on the one hand would enhance its export offer, and on the other hand would fill a gap in the flow of producer goods on the domestic market. The criterion of efficiency is the ability to obtain export prices for produced products which would ensure a decent processing profit added to the transaction or world price of the metal. This second element is particularly emphasized in the Works. For many years, and to a lesser degree now too, the domestic processing industry garners "unsubstantiated" benefits flowing from the system of prices on raw copper. This price, which is the basis for calculating the efficiency of export in the

processing sector, is always lower (in some cases even flagrantly lower) than the transaction price obtained from the export of raw copper. This hidden method of subsidizing processing—very convenient, in any case, for the processing branch, was always severely criticized by the Works and the exporter of copper and its semi-finished products—IMPEXMETAL, i.e., those enterprises which best know how much foreign exchange Polish copper is worth. What is edifying is the fact that in the fight to make copper prices uniform, the processors are beginning to support the raw-materials lobby.

The investment being considered in Lubin is too costly for even such a giant as the Copper Mining and Metallurgy Works. The foreign-exchange support of a foreign partner is essential. Under consideration is the formation of a foreign-capital company, to which the Polish side would bring the raw materials and the building facilities, while the partner would bring the foreign exchange and sales channels. Mainly fancy copper articles would be produced. Naturally, the fair in Poznan is not the only place and time in which a partner would be sought, however, the employees of IMPEXMETAL, the office which represents the trade interests of the Works, have their eyes and ears open to any and all propositions for doing a good business.

The desire of the Lubin Copper Works to enter into the processing field was demonstrated even last year when the Elpena cable factory in Legnica was purchased. This step, read as a schism in the cable industry, was supposed to be an argument in favor of basing the calculation of the profitability of the export of cable and conduit on common-sense principles, i.e., the above-mentioned transaction price of the raw material. Thus, Elpena under the Works does not have an easier life than it did in the cable branch. True, there is no problem with the supply of copper (which was the processing industry's main complaint in the past), but the copper is now more expensive because it is bought at world-market prices.

The Works invested in the modernization of the cable plant. This process is still under way. The plant's processing capacity is 15,000 tons of copper. In 1987 export totaled 800 tons and brought \$4 million. Elpena has no upper limit on export. There is only one condition—that it be profitable. The Poznan International Fair, therefore, was an opportunity to look for new purchasers, although competition in this field on the western markets is fierce.

The Lubin Works is associated with everything having to do with copper, and not very much, thus far, with Manhattan. Yet one of the Works' 20 factories, Zakmat, from Polkowice, which in the past has performed the supply function for the mills and their facilities, began to produce working and tourism apparel. The latter is being exported to the Swiss department store chain, Manhattan, and to Ireland. Right now this is the Work's newest venture, although this year it will already earn \$100,000. But who knows whether we might not see it at future fairs in Poznan.



Since March Zakmat has made another step towards the processing of copper. It has begun to produce electrical bundles from conduits supplies by Elpena. This will save Polar a little foreign exchange because it will fill a gap in covering its manufacturing needs.

The desire to establish production cooperation with Western countries was also the main purpose of Hutmen's (Wroclaw) presence at the Poznan Fair, notwithstanding the fact that it traditionally presents a wide-range offer and is one of the leading processors of nonferrous metals. Hutmen produces 65,000 tons of copper and copper alloys a year and makes rods, tubing and sections out of half of that. Export's share in the production of semifinished products exceeds 30 percent. Approximately 80 percent of deliveries for foreign markets are various types of rods. This year sales will total \$20 million. The traditional sales markets are the United States, Canada, Western Europe and the Far East.

Hutmen has no problem in selling its present product mix on the Western Market. All of the products are made according to Western parameters and are often tailored to the customer's individual requirements. Actually, in this situation the firm could rest on its laurels were it not for the knowledge that adding new, more-processed products to the production program is an opportunity to obtain a greater inflow of foreign exchange and to meet the new needs of the domestic market. Such new needs, and we are referring here first of all to copper tubing and couplings, are being created by the building industry.

Copper installations for the building industry are really Hutmen's production task for the next decade. Talks were held in Poznan with Western partners precisely in relation to the production of copper couplings. The size of the production planned by the enterprise (about 20 million units a year) will greatly exceed, at least for now, the needs of the domestic market. Therefore, a partner who, regardless of his participation in outlays, will

ensure sales of the surplus for foreign exchange, is indispensable. Search is also under way for partners to produce copper tubing and also suppliers of equipment which will make it possible to modernize production lines and adapt them to the requirements of the world market and more effective pollution control. Hutmen plans to expand the production of copper bars which, in the past, were sold only marginally on the foreign market.

Szopienice Nonferrous Metals Works also sought foreign partners for its own investment programs. One of the oldest metals works in the country, it produces all nonferrous metals and their alloys with the exception of aluminum, and rolled products from zinc, lead and copper. The most modern department in the Metals Works, equipped with American technology from the late 1970's, is a rolling mill which produces copper and brass strip. Its present capacity, 30,000 tons a year, is designed half for export, which this year, for the entire enterprise, should reach \$30 million. It is in the interest of the Metals Works to increase the production of the rolling mill 20 percent and to change and expand the product mix. But the copper-processing program entails large investment outlays, on the order of even several million dollars, which the Metals Works alone cannot afford, even if IMPEXMETAL assists it with foreign exchange. A wealthy partner from the West is needed for such an endeavor. Szopienice is also interested in entering into a partnership which would produce fittings based on castings produced in the Metals Works.

Concluding with these examples of the Fair's relationships to metalworking plants, it must be said, with praise, that regardless of how plentiful the cooperation obtained at this year's Poznan International Fair is, the actions of the producers and exporters are directed at selling the raw-materials riches of our country at the highest prices possible, and therefore, with the highest value added.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### GDR Physician Details Potential Effects of War in Europe

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[Article by Prof Dr Hans Roeding: "50 Years After the Start of World War II: The Medical Effects of a War in Europe Today"]

[Text] Prof Dr Hans Roeding, Potsdam, discusses in a 62-page paper the medical effects of a war in central Europe. Some 50 years after the beginning of World War II, which was particularly devastating for Europe, the author describes with pitiless harshness the effects a war would have on our continent today. Prof Dr Roeding outlines the scenario of a war in central Europe by examining, from a physician's standpoint, the weapons systems of today and their effects as well as acute war-inflicted mechanical, thermal, chemical, microbiological, radiogenic, and physical injuries.

The scientist admits the uncertainty of the prognosis due to the "unpredictability of the timing of events, the spatial spread, and the severity and duration of the war." "In that sense, it is a very generalized model, which pays special attention to the pessimistic, although conceivably realistic aspects in the medical area, without making any claim for their completeness and without ranking them or rating their importance."

These are excerpts from the scenario:

1. The population in central Europe is highly vulnerable to the use of nuclear and area-effective conventional weapons because of the high population density per unit of area and its primary concentration in larger cities. Any use of these weapons would necessarily and immediately cause heavy casualties and massive damage among the people.

2. A war among the central European states themselves no longer requires troops to penetrate foreign territories. Rather, the spatial dimensions of most states are such that virtually any point of their territory can be reached by land, sea, and air based distant weapons. For example, the maximum north-south extension of the GDR is about 500 km, the east-west extension about 3600 km and airplanes and missiles can reach or fly over it in a matter of minutes. This eliminates practically all early warnings and hence any possible evacuation of people or production facilities to less threatened regions, including all efforts to prepare the health care system for such an emergency.

3. Since military actions primarily affect the population centers in the cities, weapons will have a much more devastating effect because of the accompanying inevitable destruction of elements of the infrastructure, of industrial facilities located there as well as of energy

resources and raw, semifinished, and finished products, especially of the chemical industry, stored there.

4. Due to the favored destruction of cities, the health care system will lose the major parts of its physical basis such as large and particularly efficient hospitals located there. Since employees usually live close to their place of work, losses of health care system personnel would be relatively more serious than in other areas of society.

5. Whenever cities are destroyed or heavily damaged, their productive facilities for all important medical supplies are also being destroyed, partially or completely. Likewise, since cities are also transportation centers, the connections between the cities and the surrounding areas would be disrupted or so impaired that the distribution and redistribution of medical supplies could, at the very least, be impeded, if not made impossible. The same would apply to the movement of people; hence for the moment, it would be impossible to evacuate any injured and healthy people and relocate the surviving workers, including those of the health care system.

6. In view of the shortage of electric power and of adequate supplies of raw, semifinished, and finished products across national borders, it is hard to say whether the undamaged productive facilities in the pharmaceutical and medical-technology industry would be able to operate. At the present time, the GDR maintains import relations, of varying importance, with 24 European and non-European countries that supply its health care system, and these relations most probably would be disrupted in case of war.

7. Nowadays, the surviving population of central European countries, physically not directly affected, would for all practical purposes no longer be in a position to supply its own water and food requirements.

It largely has lost its vital skills to survive, e.g., to process raw products and live on them, to give birth to children without medical assistance, to bring up babies without prepared food, to care for the sick and frail without outside help or to perform a simple medical process. We would be able to regain those skills only in a long-term learning process.

8. Today, thanks to medical and special measures, people are still alive who, under less favorable circumstances, would have died. However, that also means that a larger proportion of our population today requires constant medical and social care and the supply of medicines or similar products in order to stay alive, remain healthy or enjoy an appropriate quality of life.

Unless these services can be provided on a continuing basis, a proportion of the affected persons will have to die sooner (of illnesses such as diabetes, dialysis-dependent kidney failure, in addition to patients requiring intensive therapy, etc.), while the health of others will deteriorate further or the quality of their remaining life will drastically decline, bordering at times on helplessness.

A not unimportant share of responsibility for this negative development would probably be due to the quantitative and qualitative shortage of food which, under existing conditions, could not be resolved by rationalizing.

9. In the event of a very large number of casualties in the aftermath of a war, it would hardly be possible to diagnose and treat, in a timely fashion, life-threatening illnesses from the normal morbidity spectrum of a population. This would include, among other things: acute abdominal pains requiring surgery, serious complications in pregnancies, acute strokes and other brain bleedings, life-threatening conditions at an early age, acute coronary infarctions, etc.

In sections 10 through 17, Prof Dr Roeding provides a detailed list of medical services that would no longer be available. For instance, power failures would force "an almost complete cessation of surgery, lab diagnosis of any kind, video diagnosis, functional diagnosis, as well as infusion or dialysis treatments. Disruption or destruction of cold-storage chains would prevent almost all blood transfusions. A breakdown in the water supply and the supply of drugs, dressing materials of any kind, chemicals, food, X-ray films, and other consumer goods would have similar effects."

The author has reached the following conclusions:

This conceivable scenario demonstrates that a large proportion of the population in affected central European countries will, of necessity, be killed as the result of the direct effects of nuclear and conventional weapons. Potentially, an equally high proportion of the population

will suffer direct and indirect injuries that require medical care. However, the remaining functioning parts of the health care systems will be unable to give the necessary care in a timely and proper way so that, in time, the affected people will succumb to their injuries.

The remaining, probably very small part of the population, which is not at all or only slightly injured, can be cared for by the members of the health care system who—after having used up all potentially available local reserves of materials and medicines—rely on themselves and on improvising, but can still provide the following services:

- Performing smaller septic surgery on the skin surface, with local anaesthetic,
- Administering locally produced, popular medicine-type preparations, which in most cases have no effect as a cure in the original sense, but may at best soothe individual ailments,
- Recommending and providing instruction for "physical therapy," such as the application of heat, cold, and moisture, or dietary advice to the extent that the latter is still feasible, as well as
- Providing advice on health-promoting, illness-impeding behavior, including information on personal and collective hygiene, as well as help in organizing and applying antiepidemic measures, if only in the sense of isolating sick people, who are contagious.

Hence, at best, "care giving" would only be possible at the level of prescientific medicine.

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